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“[T]he court is standing on its own shoulders” when it relies on its
own opinions in interpreting the FAA. ~ Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 132 (2001) (Stevens, dissenting).
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration scholars have long questioned whether the Supreme
Court treats the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) like other statutes. Over
the last two decades, individual Justices used tools of interpreting the FAA
that are inconsistent with their overarching philosophies regarding
statutory interpretation. For instance, Justice Scalia, a renowned textualist,
often appeals to public policy and business-specific interests in
interpreting the FAA. 1 Justice Breyer, a famous purposivist, cites
textualists tools, such as dictionaries and canons in arbitration opinions. 2
This Article examines empirical data from all Supreme Court FAA cases
to determine what tools of interpretation the Court finds most influential.
Although scholars have completed similar analyses in other areas of the
law, this Article is the first specifically analyzing arbitration cases.
Following the lead of statutory interpretation scholars, this Article is
both empirical and doctrinal. 3 This Article provides descriptive statistics
1. See F RANK B. C ROSS, THE THEORY AND P RACTICE OF S TATUTORY INTERPRETATION 140
(2009) (Justice Scalia “is a devout supporter of textualism as an interpretive approach and a persistent
critic of any reliance on legislative history.”); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. 228, 237–
39 (2013) (citing the lack of inefficiency as a reason for interpreting the FAA to apply to bilateral
arbitration but not classwide arbitration); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 536 U.S. 333, 348–50
(2011) (relying on broad, practical concerns in holding that the FAA is intended to regulate bilateral,
but not classwide, arbitration).
2. See C ROSS, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 140–41 (describing Justice
Breyer as having “clearly expressed views” on the use of tools such as legislative history). See, e.g.,
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1426 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (invoking a canon
of construction of reading a statute to give meaning to all portions); Allied–Bruce Terminix Co. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274 (1995) (considering roughly contemporaneous dictionaries to determine
the meaning of the phrase “involving” commerce).
3. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 222–26 (2010) [hereinafter Roberts Court]
(describing the empirical and doctrinal aspects of her statutory interpretation project).
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on statutory interpretation of the FAA since its inception in 1925. 4 In
addition, this Article provides doctrinal analysis of patterns unique to the
arbitration docket. This analysis is intended to be compatible with and
comparable to other studies involving anslyis of tools of statutory
interpretation.
This research shows empirically what Justice Stevens observed in the
opening quotation— the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence is insular,
building more off itself than anything else. Compared to other scholars’
studies, my analysis shows an overreliance on three key tools of
interpretation: former Supreme Court precedent, the text of the FAA, and
the arbitration canon.
Arbitration decisions appear more controversial over time, as
evidenced by a rising number of dissenting and concurring opinions and
narrower vote margins. As the reach of the FAA expands, more disputes
are subject to arbitration, including consumer and employee disputes. 5
Additionally, recent cases demonstrate a clear preference for bilateral
arbitration (i.e., arbitration between two parties) at the exclusion of
classwide arbitration (or arbitration involving unnamed class members). 6
These two trends pose interesting questions of statutory interpretation
because these types of arbitration cases did not exist at the time of the
FAA’s passage. 7
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (1925).
5. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (allowing arbitration
of a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440 (2006) (requiring arbitration of claims of usury under Florida law for checking cashing
customer).
6. The first case hostile to classwide arbitration was Stolt-Nielsen, N.A. v. International
AnimalFeeds, Int’l Corp., 599 U.S. 662 (2009) (holding arbitrator exceeded authority by reading a
“silent” clause as permitting classwide arbitration). This precedent has been further expanded in cases
such as AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (preempting a California precedent
that would have invalidated class action waivers in arbitration), and American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (upholding class action waiver despite expert testimony that
proving the substantive antitrust violation would cost significantly in excess of any individual putative
class member’s potential recovery).
7. Class action rules were first promulgated in 1938, but the modern-day damages classes are
a product of the revisions of the 1966 revisions to the Federal Rules. See Deborah R. Hensler, Happy
50th Anniversary Rule 23! Shouldn’t We Know You Better After All This Time?, 165 U. P A. L. R EV.
1599, 1600 (2017) (providing history of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). In addition,
many of the employment and consumer claims now subject to arbitration did not exist at the time of
the FAA’s passing. See Jean Sternlight, Hurrah for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
Consumer Arbitration as a Poster Child for Regulation, 48 S T. MARY’S L.J. 343, 346 (2016) (“Once
upon a time, arbitration was a dispute resolution process that was adopted knowingly and voluntarily
by two or more businesses that preferred to resolve disputes outside of court.”); Carmen Comsti, A
Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in the Workplace, 35 B ERKLEY. J. EMP. & LAB. L.
5, 11–12 (2014) (recounting the history of the FAA how its purpose was to enforce arms-length
agreements between businesses).
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This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides an overview of
notable principles in statutory interpretation. Part III presents a literature
review of empirical work in statutory interpretation and arbitration. Part
IV provides my methodology. Part V relates the conclusions of this
research and compares this study to others done in the past. Finally, Part
VI discusses the next steps for this research, particularly additional work
that can be done as it relates to arbitration jurisprudence.
II. OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES
Judges have great latitude in how they interpret statutes. 8 Judges
usually look first to the statute to determine its meaning without
interpretive aids, 9 but no rule of law prohibits a judge from using such
tools even if the language is clear. 10 Although “there is nothing close to
consensus regarding the correct way to engage in statutory interpretation,”
the set of interpretive tools used by judges have been relatively consistent
over time and have “not undergone all that much change for 200 years.”11
Today’s primary theories of statutory interpretation include textualism,
purposivism, and intentionalism. 12 A judge’s philosophy may limit or
expand the types of tools used. This section outlines major theories of
statutory interpretation and how those theories relate to specific tools of
interpretation for judges adhering to those philosophies.

8. See C ROSS, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1–10 (describing the imperfect
theory of the judiciary as the agent of Congress to determine how to interpret the laws passed by the
legislative branch).
9. Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation:
Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. R EV. 71, 73–74 (2018)
(“When text straightforwardly suffices to answer a question, no further investigation is needed, and
evidence about congressional purpose will not override it. Even ambiguous or unclear text can bound
the range of permissible interpretations that interpretive strategies such as legislative purpose analysis
might otherwise open up.”); Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of
Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 7 (2003) (“If the relevant statutory text is deemed to be clear
and unambiguous (a.k.a. has a plain meaning), then the court simply applies that statutory text—
unless there is some ill-defined exception, such as absurd results, or clearly expressed legislative
intent to the contrary.”) (citations omitted) (internal citations omitted).
10. Mullins, supra note 9, at 8 (“When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in
the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear
the words may appear on ‘superficial examination.’”) (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’n,
310 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1940)).
11. Lawrence Baum & James J. Brudney, Two Roads Diverged: Statutory Interpretation by the
Circuit Courts and Supreme Court in the Same Cases, 88 F ORDHAM L. R EV. 823, 832 (2019); Mullins,
supra note 9, at 14–15.
12. Mark Tushnet, Theory and Practice in Statutory Interpretation, 43 TEX. TECH. L. R EV.
1185, 1185 (2011) (noting that these labels and ideas are largely theoretical and “[w]hen it comes
down to actually interpreting statutes, the differences between the Justices become quite small.”).
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Textualism

Textualism is a method of statutory interpretation seeking meaning
primarily from the language of the statute. 13 Under this theory, the intent
of the legislature is largely irrelevant. 14 Some jurists subscribe to
textualism because they consider the collective intent of legislators to be
impossible to determine. 15 Others, such as Justice Scalia, found textualism
appealing because it theoretically binds judges to a narrower set of
possible interpretations. 16
If the statute is ambiguous, textualists often consider tools such as
dictionaries, the whole act rule, and canons of interpretation. 17 The intent
of canons is to reduce bias in statutory interpretation. 18 The canons have
13. Anita Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 981 (2016) [hereinafter Dueling
Canons] (“Textualism is a formalist method of statutory interpretation that seeks answers primarily
from the official language of the statute. It directs judges to identify the ordinary meaning, at the time
of enactment, of the statutory term in question.”); see also Daniel J. Olds, Ordinary Meaning, Context,
and Textualism in Texas Statutory Interpretation, 52 TEX. TECH. L. R EV. 485, 489 (2020)
(“[T]extualists believe that the best indication of legislative intent is the text of the statute itself.”).
14. See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use
of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 1653 (2010) (discussing the underlying theories for
textualism).
15. Id. at 1661 (“Judge Easterbrook, for one, has insisted that no such ‘intent’ can be divined:
‘The meaning of statutes is to be found not in the subjective, multiple mind of Congress,’ he has
argued, for the simple reason that a multimember body such as Congress cannot formulate or act upon
a single intent as if it were a unitary entity.”) (citations omitted).
16. See id. (“Justice Scalia . . . condemned [using legislative history] in memorable terms as
‘that last hope of lost interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction.’ In
his view, legislative history materials provide ‘increasingly unreliable evidence of what the voting
Members of Congress actually had in mind.’”) (citations omitted); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified
Textualism, 119 YALE L. J. 1750, 1762 (2010) (describing textualism as a “an interpretive approach
that emphasizes textual analysis, interpretive predictability, and cabined judicial discretion”). Justice
Scalia has a modified textualist view that relies primarily on the text, but he is also willing to consider
the “apparent purpose” of the statute, as well as policy consequences of decisions. C ROSS, supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 140.
17. See Jonathan H. Choi, An Empirical Study of Statutory Interpretation in Tax Law, 95
N.Y.U. L. R EV. 363, 383 (2020) (noting that textualists are most likely to consider plain meaning,
dictionaries, and language canons); Dueling Canons, supra note 13, at 982–83 (discussing the tools
of interpretation most likely to be utilized by a textualist); Gluck, supra note 16, at 1763
(“[T]extualists place a heavy emphasis on text and text-based interpretive rules (for example,
dictionary definitions, textual ‘context,’ and the so-called ‘linguistic’ or ‘textual’ canons—defaul t
presumptions based on common rules of grammar and word usage) rather than looking for other,
extrinsic evidence.”); Olds, supra note 13, at 490 (“First, judges will often analyze the ambiguous
word or phrase to determine what its ordinary meaning is. A favorite way to do this is by simply
looking up the word’s definition in a dictionary.”).
18. ANTONIN S CALIA & B RYAN A. GARNER, R EADING LAW : THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS, xxviii (2012) (noting that canons “will narrow the range of acceptable judicial decisionmaking and . . . will curb—even reverse—the tendency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with
their own policy preferences”); Mendelson, supra note 9, at 80 (2018) (“Textual canons are often
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different goals, some of which are grammatical, 19 some seek rules to
interpret words based on linguistic conventions, 20 while others invoke
substantive policy. 21 Arbitration law has generated many canons,
including a presumption to enforce arbitration agreements in labor and
non-labor settings, deference to arbitral awards, and a rule favoring
arbitration of statutory claims. 22 Yet, canon use is not without criticism.
Different canons may lead to different outcomes, and the “sheer number
and variety of canons” may end up “widening,” rather than constraining
“judicial discretion.” 23
Textualists generally do not use legislative history to interpret
statutes. 24 Textualists deny the ability to know the mental state of a
collective legislating body and criticize picking and choosing pieces of

described as policy-neutral tools to decode the meaning of Congress’s language. They include
grammatical and punctuation rules, as well as rules that assume internal consistency and
nonredundancy in textual drafting.”).
19. See Cross, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 87 (describing cannons that apply
basic rules of grammar such as the difference between “may” and “must”); James Durling, Comment,
Diagramming Interpretation, 35 YALE J. ON R EG. 325, 339 (2018) (describing grammar canons as
those that “identify a few specific syntactical rules”).
20. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. R EV. 1, 12 (2005) [hereinafter Canons of Construction] (“Language
canons consist of predictive guidelines as to what the legislature likely meant based on its choice of
certain words rather than others, or its grammatical configuration of those words in a given sentence,
or the relationship between those words and text found in other parts of the” statute.).
21. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation:
Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1240
(2009) [hereinafter Warp and Woof] (“Most of the statute-based substantive canons are couched in
broadly applicable terms, but some relate to specific subject areas including a number of tax lawrelated substantive canons.”); Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 13 (“Substantive canons,
unlike their linguistic counterparts, are generally meant to reflect a judicially preferred policy
position. . . . [They] reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded in the courts’ understanding of how
to treat statutory text with reference to judicially perceived constitutional priorities, pre-enactmen t
common law practices, or specific statutorily based policies.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. R EV. 26, 97–108 (1994) (providing a
comprehensive list of canons of statutory interpretation).
22. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at 106 (noting arbitration-related canons of
construction).
23. See Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,”
Eight to Twelve, 51 N.Y.L. S CH. L. R EV. 1002, 1004–08 (2006) (providing a background Karl
Llewellyn’s of the fourteen “dueling canons” that can be used to arrive at different outcomes
depending on which canon the judge chooses). Mendelson, supra note 9, at 77.
24. Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1658 (discussing the possibility that judges use legislative
history “cynically” to achieve a desired outcome, rather than adhering to the true meaning of a statute).
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legislative hisotry to support an outcome. 25 Further, textualists worry that
reliance on legislative history unduly elevates its status. 26
B.

Intentionalism

The intentionalist theory considers the intent of the legislature
passing the statute. 27 Many intentionalists consider the “constructive
intent” by considering the intent of the bill sponsors or the committees
first reviewing the legislation. 28 Others try to step into the shoes of the
legislature to determine how it would have applied the statute to a given
situation. 29 The intentionalist theory is grounded in principles of agency
and democracy, with judges acting as agents of the legislature to interpret
and follow its choices, advancing “democracy by carrying out the will of
the elected legislators.” 30
If the text is ambiguous, 31 intentionalist (and purposivist) judges may
consider legislative history and other historical documents. 32 While
25. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 1186 (“Justice Scalia abjures the use of the word ‘intent,’
believing that it refers to inner mental states of individual legislators and is therefore inappropriate in
statutory interpretation.”); Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1662 (“Judge Leventhal of the D.C.
Circuit famously likened the selective use of legislative history by judges to ‘looking over a crowd
and picking out your friends.’ . . . [Given the vast material] from which they have to choose, it is all
too tempting for a judge to take only what is convenient.”) (citation omitted); Dueling Canons, supra
note 13, at 983 (“Textualists trust such bounded interpretive aids to lead courts to the proper statutory
construction— and to restrict the opportunity for ‘strong-willed judges to substitute their own
personal political views for those of the legislature.’”) (citation omitted).
26. Gluck, supra note 16, at 1763 (“Some textualists also argue that reliance on legislative
history works an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking authority to subportions of Congress
(committees), or worse, congressional staffers (who write the reports).”).
27. Theo I. Ogune, Judges and Statutory Construction: Judicial Zombism or Context Activism?,
30 U. B ALT. L. F. 4, 17 (“‘Intent,’ thus, reveals more of the text’s intended meaning, and ‘purpose’ is
simply the broad goal of the statute.”).
28. Id. (describing constructive intentionalism and the tools of interpretation associated with
the theory).
29. Id. (discussing “imaginative intentionalism” and how Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
describes the theory).
30. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC S TATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1, 14 (1994); see also
Madeline June Kaas, A Least Bad Approach for Interpreting ESA Stealth Provisions, 32 WM. &
MARY ENV. L. & P OL’Y R EV. 427, 432 (2008) (noting that intentionalism upholds the tri-part system
of government in the United States).
31. Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1658 (“A different and long-popular view, which in recent
years has been most visibly championed by Justice Breyer, is that judges should and do cite legislative
history for the innocuous reason that it is a useful aid to interpreting statutes that lack clear meaning.”);
Tushnet, supra note 12, at 1192 (“Both Justices Scalia and Breyer agree that their differences over
statutory interpretation arise only when the text is to some degree uncertain.”).
32. Choi, supra note 17, at 383 (noting how purposivist jurists are more likely to rely on
legislative history than textualists); Dueling Canons, supra note 13, at 989 (“Purposive statutory
interpretation typically involves inquiries into legislative history, the societal problem that prompted
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legislative history is included in many documents, some bears greater
weight than others. 33 Reports and other documents demonstrating
legislative consensus are often considered the most reliable type of
legislative history. 34 Conversely, statements by individuals hold less
weight, with statements of witnesses and lobbyists carrying the least
amount of weight. 35 Legislative history, while not part of the text, still
helps “attribute meaning to text.” 36 When legislative history is expansive,
this theory permits using pieces consistent with the text to determine
meaning.
C.

Purposivism

The term purposivism is difficult to define because it is a “slippery
term, with no single definition.” 37 The theory grew from the “Legal
Process School,” and the techniques outlined by Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks became highly influential in the mid-twentieth century. 38 Judges
adhering to a purposivist philosophy try to determine what the legislature
sought to accomplish in passing the legislation. 39 At its core, purposivism
attempts to answer the following question: How would a “‘reasonable

the legislature to enact the statute, legislative intent, and other sources that might illuminate a statute’s
objectives.”).
33. Warp and Woof, supra note 21, at 1243 (“[T]he legislative history most frequently invoked
by courts is standing committee reports. Courts also rely on other legislative record items, including
original bill language, committee hearings, floor statements and related developments such as
proposed amendments and conference reports.”).
34. See, e.g., Mark Deforrest, Taming a Dragon: Legislative History in Legal Analysis, 39 U.
DAYTON L. R EV. 37, 70 (2013) (“One type of legislative history that carries a good deal of weight is
Committee Reports. These reports have long been used by courts when examining legislative
history.”).
35. Warp and Woof, supra note 21, at 1244–45 (“Unlike the canons or judicial precedent,
committee and floor statements are produced by partisans—individuals with a policy stake in the
lawmaking contest to which they are contributing.”).
36. Id., at 1244.
37. Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009
MICH. S T. L. R EV. 89, 92 (2009).
38. John David Ohlendorf, Purposivism Outside Statutory Interpretation, 21 TEX. R EV. L. &
P OL. 235, 237 (discussing the history of purposivism).
39. Dueling Canons, supra note 13, at 989 (“In contrast to textualism, it advocates that jurists
interpret the words of a statute by identifying the statute’s purpose and selecting the meaning that best
effectuates that purpose.”); Herz, supra note 37, at 92–93 (“‘[P]urpose’ refers to what the legislature
ultimately sought to accomplish. Intent is about means; purpose about ends.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW . U. L. R EV. 269, 296 (2019) (“I shall emphasize the
strand of purposivist thought that seeks to approximate the model of conversational interpretation by
viewing purposes as closely analogous substitutes for, rather than a sharp alternative to, legislative
intent as a basis for statutory interpretation.”).
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legislator’ . . . resolve[] the problem addressed by the statute?” 40 Other
articulations of the question include: “What was the problem Congress
was trying to solve? (This is the ‘evil’ rule.) What were Congress’s
purposes in enacting this provision? What did Congress have in mind
when it enacted this provision?” 41 Purposivism assumes that every statute
has a purpose but recognizes that statutes may have multiple purposes. 42
Once the purpose is determined, the statute is interpreted to meet the
purpose. 43 Justice Breyer, a well-known purposivist, is comfortable
relying on legislative history to determine both purpose and meaning. 44
Perhaps the biggest difference between intentionalism and
purposivism is that the former considers intent at a locked point in time
(when the statute was enacted) while the latter allows for a more dynamic
view of legislation that considers the current needs of society. 45 Today,
the practical difference in these philosophies is shrinking, largely because
the textualist movement has reigned in purposivist judges. 46
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section considers two separate lines of research. The first
considers studies in statutory interpretation, and the second considers
empirical work in arbitration.

40. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 C OLUM. L. R EV. 70,
78 (2006).
41. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 1198 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Ogune, supra note 27, at 15–16 (discussing difficulties with the purposivist theory).
43. See Daniel O’Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The NLRB and
Methods of Statutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. R EV. 177, 194 (2008) (“Purposivism provides that
judges should identify the statute’s purpose and then determine which interpretation would best
effectuate that purpose.”).
44. Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1660 (“[Legislative history] can also help judges to avoid[]
an absurd result, explain[ ] specialized meanings, choos[e] among reasonable interpretations of a
politically controversial statute, and even illuminate drafting errors that courts should correct—as the
Court itself has demonstrated on various occasions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. O’Gorman, supra note 43, at 195 (“Because purposivism states Congress’s purpose in more
general terms than identifying what Congress’s intent was or would have been with respect to the
particular issue, purposivism allows statutory interpretation to be more flexible and to thereby change
a statute’s meaning in response to new circumstances.”); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in
Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. R EV. 1073, 1081 (1992) (“Under the
dynamic approach, judges interpreting statutes focus on the current needs or values of society.”).
46. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 C OLUM. L. R EV. 1, 36 (2006)
(“[N]either side of the [legislation] debate has been eager to acknowledge just how much we have all
become textualists.”); see also Manning, supra note 40, at 78 (“Conversely, certain features of
purposivism reflect textualist practices and assumptions more deeply than textualists sometimes
acknowledge.”).
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Statutory Interpretation Research

Empirical analysis of court decisions by legal scholars is growing. 47
Studies examining the use of tools of statutory interpretation generally fall
along two dichotomies. The first considers the breadth of cases. The
second considers the types of tools the researcher considers within the
analysis.
1. Breadth of Cases Researched
Research to date has varied in the number and types of cases studied.
My study is modeled closely after the research of Professor Anita
Krishnakumar, who published a series of articles analyzing all Supreme
Court cases during the Roberts Court era. Her first article considers all
statutory interpretation decisions in the first three years of the Roberts
Court, leading to an examination of 166 cases and 352 opinions looking
for broad trends in the Court’s decisions. 48 Her second study expanded the
timeframe, adding cases through 2010, leading to an examination of 255
cases and 528 opinions. 49 However, this second article had a narrower
focus that looked primarily at a phenomenon known as dueling canons,
or interpreting the same canon in multiple opinions. 50 Professor
Krishnakumar’s third article added cases through July 2017, resulting in
499 cases and 995 total opinions. 51 The third article asked whether
Supreme Court justices use backdoor purposivism, textualist tools used in
an outcome-determinative way. 52 Professor Nina Mendelson also studied
the Roberts Court use tools of interpretation. 53 Her article examines the
first decade of the Roberts Court, covering “838 majority, plurality,
concurring, and dissenting opinions, found in 460 separate decisions.” 54
Other scholars used smaller samples. For instance, Professor Frank
Cross examined roughly 120 Supreme Court cases between 1994 and

47. C ROSS, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 135–39 (providing a historical
overview of the study of statutory interpretation).
48. Roberts Court, supra note 3, at 231.
49. Dueling Canons, supra note 13, at 921–22 (2016) (discussing methodology).
50. Id. at 925 (discussing how a “dueling canon” is one in which a majority or concurrence and
a dissent all rely on the same canon to determine the outcome of a case).
51. Anita Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1292 (2020) [hereinafter
Backdoor Purposivism] (describing methodology).
52. Id. at 1278 (“This Article is the first to expose and chronicle the decidedly purposivist and
intentionalist undertones to the Roberts Court’s use of textualist canons, interpretive tools, and
practical consequences arguments.”).
53. Mendelson, supra note 9.
54. Id. at 90.
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2002 to determine interpretive tools used by individual justices. 55
Professor Cross’s analysis considers each justice’s vote in each case. 56
Similarly, Professor Nicholas Zeppos sampled cases by randomly
selecting twenty terms between 1890 to 1990, yielding a study of 413
cases. 57 In contrast, Professors David Law and David Zaring considered
“all Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases decided from the 1953
term through the 2006 term,” provided the statute was interpreted nine or
more times. 58 Law and Zaring’s dataset involved 1479 cases and 3095
different opinions, making it one of the largest studies in statutory
interpretation. 59
Other scholars focus on more limited inquiries, such as cases within
specific subject matter. For example, Professor James Brudney has
authored a number of studies analyzing labor and employment cases and
comparing those cases to other areas of the law. In 2019, he published a
study with Professor Lawrence Baum covering Supreme Court and circuit
court labor and employment cases from 1969 to 2017. 60 These two
professors also authored a study looking specifically at criminal, business,
and labor and employment cases. 61 An earlier study Professor Baum
55. C ROSS, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 142–43 (discussing methodology);
see also Roberts Court, supra note 3, at 229 (“Cross’s aim was to measure the Court’s and individual
Justices’ patterns of canon usage for consistency with the different theoretical approaches, as well as
to test the various interpretive methodologies’ ability to constrain ideological decisionmaking.”).
56. C ROSS, supra note 1, at 143 (noting that he studied “over one thousand separate justicevotes for analysis” with the “vote of each justice” as “the basic unit of analysis for this study”).
57. Zeppos, supra note 45, at 1088. Unlike the other studies noted in this literature review, the
Zeppos analysis only analyzed majority opinions, and not concurring or dissenting opinions. In
contrast, Professor Schacter conducted a relatively small analysis (45 cases) of cases solely during
the 1996 Term. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 S TAN.
L. R EV. 1, 10 (1998) (discussing cases analyzed).
58. Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1683–84.
59. Id. at 1685. Other studies of note include Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge,
Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX.
L. R EV. 1317, 1329 (2014) (“286 overrides of 275 Supreme Court decisions that had interpreted a
federal statute” between 1967 and 2011.”); Brian J. Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After the
Override: An Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent, 46 J. LEGAL S TUD. 51, 61 (2017) (considering
166 Supreme Court “statutory interpretation cases subsequently overridden by Congress, 55 cases
subsequently overruled by the Court, and a matched control group of 141 Supreme Court decisions
that were neither overridden nor overruled”); William Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The Continuum
of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan,
96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1094 (2008).
60. See Baum & Brudney, supra note 11, at 837–38 (reviewing “321 cases: 116 from the Burger
Court, 100 from the Rehnquist Court, and 105 from the Roberts Court”).
61. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for
Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 483, 516–17 (2013)
(analyzing “695 Supreme Court Cases from 1986–2010”).
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conducted with Professor Corey Distlear focused solely on statutory
interpretation in workplace and tax laws. 62 The Baum and Distlear study
analyzed 623 cases involving “employees in their status as employees”
since the beginning of the Berger Court. 63 Professor Jonathan Choi, in
what may be an analysis of the largest number of decisions, studied all
Internal Revenue Service publications since 1919 to consider whether the
IRS and the Tax Court employed purposivist or originalist tools. 64 In
another study of tax cases, a team of researchers led by Professor Nancy
Staudt considered 922 cases from 1912 to 2000. 65 These studies give a
flavor of research done to date, but this review is not comprehensive. 66
2. Breadth of Tools Examined
Scholars also vary in the type of tools considered for their research.
For example, Professor Krishnakumar’s database is more extentive than
other scholars, capturing the presence or absence of fourteen different
interpretive tools.. 67 However, Professor Krishnakumar only coded for
tools an opinion actually relied on, 68 and her cases were coded by human
62. See Warp and Woof, supra note 21; Canons of Construction, supra note 20.
63. Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 16.
64. Choi, supra note 17, at 382–83 (discussing data set).
65. See Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, Peter Wiedenbeck, René Linst. . .dt & Ryan J. Vander
Wielen, Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. R EV. 1909, 1297 (2005) (discussing
case selection). A final study worth noting was a limited examination of 42 bankruptcy cases between
1983 and 2000, which considered a wide range of interpretive tools. See Alan Schwartz, The New
Textualism and the Rule of Law Subtext in the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 45 N.Y.
L. S CH. L. R EV. 149, 154–55, 197 (2001).
66. Additional studies of note include Lyman Johnson & Jason A. Cantone, Justice Stevens and
Securities Law, 12 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 77, 84 (2016) (analyzing eighty-six cases to determine Justice
Stevens’ legacy in the area of securities), Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical
Investigation of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J.
129, 144 (2008) (analyzing “a sample of forty-two randomly selected statutory interpretation dissents
that Justice Scalia wrote between 1986 and 2006”).
67. Roberts Court, supra note 3, at 231–32. The fourteen interpretive tools are: (1) the text or
plain meaning, (2) dictionary definitions, (3) grammar-based canons, (4) the whole act rule, (5) other
statutes, (6) precedent, (7) substantive canons, (8) agency deference, (9) Supreme Court precedent,
(10) purpose, (11) practical consequences, (12) intent, (13) legislative history, and (14) languag e
canons. See also Dueling Canons, supra note 13, at 922 (coding for all the same tools, except agency
deference); Backdoor Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1292–93 (providing a list of the fourteen tools
used for coding the cases, which are the same as those from the Roberts Court article). While
Krishnakumar’s fourteen coded categories cover more variables than most of these statutory
interpretation studies, Professors Eskridge and Baer coded 156 different variables in their study of
Supreme Court decisions involving agency interpretations. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 59 at
1203–26 (providing codebook information).
68. Roberts Court, supra note 3, at 232 (“In recording the Court’s reliance on these interpretive
tools, I counted only references that reflected substantive judicial reliance on the tool in reaching an
interpretation.”); see also Dueling Canons, supra note 13, at 923 (noting a similar coding method).
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beings who used a certain amount of discretion to determine reliance.
Professor Krishnakumar’s methodology followed the earlier work of
Professors Brudney and Ditslear, who captured data on ten similar
categories, also coded by human beings (as opposed to computers). 69
However, Professors Brudney and Ditslear coded not only reliance on
tools but also situations in which a tool is referenced but not relied upon,
thus creating a more nuanced dataset. 70 Professor Brudney’s most recent
paper modifies both the number of tools used and reverted to coding for
presence or absence of tools relied on and when they coded each
individual tool. 71
Some scholars who code for a wide range of tools group them into
categories corresponding with interpretive theories. 72 For instance,
Professor Cross grouped tools into four categories: textualism, legislative
intent, pragmatism, and canons. 73 Professor Zeppos considered whether a
tool used fell into one of the following: legislative, executive, judicial,
constitutional, canons of interpretation, and other. 74 Professor Choi, using
natural language searches and machine learning for his extraordinarily
large database, grouped tools as: purposivist terms, textualist terms,

69. Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 23–24 (using (1) the text or plain meaning, (2)
dictionary definitions, (3) language canons, (4) legislative history, (5) purpose, (6) legislative
inaction, (7) Supreme Court precedent, (8) common law precedent, (9) substantive canons, and (10)
agency deference); see also Warp and Woof, supra note 21, at 1249 (discussing “ten distinct
interpretive resources on which the Court relies with some frequency”). The Brudney and Distlear list
is similar to the nine categories of interpretive tools employed by Professor Schacter. See Schacter,
supra note 57, at 11–12 (using the categories of: statutory language, legislative history, other statutes,
judicial opinions, canons of construction, “administrative materials,” secondary sources, dictionaries,
and “miscellaneous other”).
70. Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 24 (discussing coding three levels of reliance);
see also Warp and Woof, supra note 21, at 1249 (discussing levels of reliance). Professor Schacter’s
research considered “only opinions making substantive use of particular interpretive resources . . . as
using the resource.” Schacter, supra note 57, at 13. However, she counted any tool “as long as an
opinion identified an interpretive resource as a legitimate source of judicial guidance on the statute’s
meaning and did not conclude that the resource was inappropriate for judicial consideration.” Id.
71. Baum & Brudney, supra note 11, at 837 n. 69 (coding only for ordinary meaning,
dictionaries, language canons, legislative history, purpose, and agency deference but not for prior
precedent).
72. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1330 (coding for plain meaning, whole act,
legislative history, precedent, agency deference, dictionaries, rule of lenity, and invocations by the
Court for Congress to revisit the issue).
73. C ROSS, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 143–44 (discussing each of these
broad categories and the tools that fall within each of the categories).
74. Zeppos, supra note 45, at 1089 (“Each category contained further breakdowns. For
example, in the broad category denominated “legislative” there were six subcategories. Category and
subcategory totals were generated for each case. These totals then provided a basis for the data used
in the analysis.”).
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statutory terms, normative terms, and substantive canons. 75 The studies
using computer assistance simply code for presence or absence and do not
consider the weight of reliance on the tool, thus reducing some
subjectivity on the part of human coders.
Other studies consider a limited number of tools, looking for answers
to more detailed research questions. For example, the research conducted
by Professors Law and Zaring only examined references to legislative
history collected through electronic searches. 76 One study by Professors
Brudney and Baum focused on dictionary use. 77 Professor Mendelson
coded her data for the presence of, and reliance on, thirty-two different
canons of construction, aggregating them into groups of textual and
substantive canons. 78 Professor Staudt’s research team focusing on tax
cases specifically tracked the Court’s use of fourteen canons, 79 and
recorded the Court’s level of reliance on the cannons. 80
All of these studies track opinion type and author. Many also
consider how many justices join an opinion as an indication of how
controversial an opinion may be. 81 These studies create a blueprint for
75. Choi, supra note 17, at 420–42 (discussing categories of terms). Most of the studies
undertaken to date have involved human coders looking for the presence or absence of certain tools
of interpretation. In contract, because Professor Choi used machine learning and other computer
technology, he was able to capture not only whether a tool was used but the frequency of various
search terms. Id. at 384–86 (describing methodology). In her study based on Justice Scalia’s opinions,
Professor McGowen grouped the tools into three general categories: text, secondary sources, and
canons. McGowan, supra note 66, at 195–98.
76. Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1685–88 (describing methodology). Law and Zaring also
tracked whether more than one opinion in the same case discussed the legislative history. Id. at 1686
(“This we did simply by noting, for each opinion, whether any other opinion in the same case had
made some reference to legislative history.”). Tracking specifically for multiple opinions discussing
the same interpretive tool is similar to the analysis that Krishnakumar conducted in her Dueling
Canons article. Duelinig Canons, supra note 13.
77. Brudney & Baum, supra note 61, at 518, n.127 (coding for dictionary use and basic case
information).
78. Mendelson, supra note 9, at 90 (describing methodology). Although this study considered
whether the Court relied on a canon, it did not grade the amount of reliance (central reliance, reliance
with other tools, etc.). Id. at 94-95.
79. Staudt, et al., supra note 65, at 1932-34 (discussing the tools considered in the study).
80. Id. at 1934 (coding “whether the Court (1) relied on it, (2) refused to rely on it, (3) found
the canon inconclusive, or (4) did not discuss the canon but implicitly relied upon it”).
81. Dueling Canons, supra note 13, at 924 (“[E]ach case and opinion was recorded as
unanimous, close margin, or wide margin (cases with six or more Justices in the majority).”); Warp
and Woof, supra note 21, at 1258–59 (coding whether the “decision (i) was unanimous (zero
dissenters); (ii) enjoyed a wide margin of support (vote differential of five, six, or seven); (iii) was
supported by a moderate-size majority (vote margin of three or four); or (iv) was a close case (vote
margin of one of two)”); see also Brian J. Broughman & Deborah Widiss, After the Override: An
Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent, 46 J. LEGAL S TUD. 51, 62 (2017) (in a study about the
continued use of overridden and overruled Supreme Court cases, the researchers coded for number of
Justices signing on to the majority opinion).
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additional work in this area. As discussed below, I fashioned my study to
be comparable with previous works. 82
B.

Empirical Work in Arbitration

This study appears to be the first study looking at statutory
interpretation of Supreme Court arbitration precedent. Most arbitration
studies look at some aspect of the arbitration process or decisions made
by arbitrators.
Although the arbitration process is generally private and not open to
the public, researchers have conducted studies on publicly available
arbitration agreements and awards, and surveys to arbitrators and
lawyers. 83 For example, arbitration scholars authored various studies on
whether arbitrators follow the law and what types of authority arbitrators
cite in their awards. 84 Some scholars used empirical means to determine
whether arbitration or litigation is the more advantageous forum for
certain claims, 85 while other scholars consider issues related to the
agreement to arbitrate itself, such as readability and the substantive
terms. 86 Empirical studies appear to be more common among scholars of
82. See discussion infra Part III (discussing methodology).
83. KRISTEN M. B LANKLEY & MAUREEN A. WESTON, UNDERSTANDING ADR 180 (2017)
(“Arbitration also permits the parties to agree to privacy.”).
84. See, e.g., Ariana R. Levinson, et al., Predictability of Arbitrators’ Reliance on External
Authority, 69 AM. U. L. R EV. 1827, 1844–51 (2020) (conducting literature review of empirical studies
primarily consisting of labor arbitration awards); id. at 1856–57 (discussing findings on citation
patterns to statutes, case law, administrative sources, and secondary sources); Mark C. Weidemaier,
Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. R EV. 1091, 1111 (2012) (noting
the citing patterns in arbitrator awards); Christopher Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A.
L. R EV. 187, 203 (2006) (noting that whether arbitrators “follow the law in their awards is
inconclusive”).
85. See, e.g., David Horton, Forced Remote Arbitration, 108 Cornell L. Rev. __ (forthcoming
2022) (comparing outcomes of claimants in remote arbitration compared to in-person arbitration);
Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Employment
Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitral and Civil Litigation, 35 B ERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91,
112 (2014) (“An analysis of approximately 700 contemporary employment discrimination cases
shows outcomes in arbitration are starkly inferior to outcomes reported in litigation: employees are
nearly forty percent more likely to win and receive average awards nearly twice as large in cases
adjudicated in the civil litigation system compared to those that are arbitrated.”); Christopher R.
Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO S T. J.
DISP. R ESOL. 843, 845–46 (2010) (reporting on fees for arbitration, time lengths for arbitration, and
relief provided in arbitration); See generally Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical
Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 P ENN. S T. L. R EV. 1051 (2009)
(discussing general trends in AAA consumer arbitration, including success rate for consumers).
86. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41
U. MICH. J.L. R EFORM 871, 876 (2008) (finding that organizations include arbitration clauses in
contracts with employees and consumers, but not in their own business-to-business contracts);
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international arbitration than domestic arbitration in the United States.87
Because previous arbitration research focused on one aspect of
arbitration—from arbitration agreement to award—this study adds to the
body of empirical literature by looking at the law surrounding arbitration.
IV. METHODS
This study builds on the literature but focuses exclusively on
Supreme Court cases interpreting the FAA. To collect the cases, I ran
electronic searches of Supreme Court cases citing each of the sixteen
sections of the FAA. 88 Although the statute was enacted almost 100 years
ago, the sixteen searches yielded an initial data set of eighty-six unique
cases. Of those, fifty-two interpreted the FAA. Those fifty-two cases
yielded one-hundred and fourteen opinions. These cases primarily involve
disputes among businesses, as well as disputes between businesses,
consumers, and employees. This study does not consider Chapters 2 or 3
of Title 9, as those chapters deal with international arbitration. 89 This
study also does not cover cases decided exclusively under statutes relating
to labor arbitration, such as the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA). 90 Under this methodology, the Steelworkers Trilogy was not
included because the Court did not interpret the FAA in its decision. 91
However, the data set does include cases that rely on interpretations of the
FAA and labor law, such as 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett and Epic Systems v.
Lewis. 92
Christopher Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH.
J.L. R EFORM 813, 840–41 (2008) (concluding that some fees in arbitration are more expensive than
litigation, but overall fees may be less in arbitration, and also concluding that arbitration may be more
accessible than litigation, while suggesting more research on class action issues).
87. See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 12
S ANTA C LARA J. INT’L L. 223, 232 (2013) (“Some of the same questions that inspire research into
judicial decision-making have also inspired empirical research into investment arbitrators’ decisionmaking.”); Chiara Giorgetti, Is Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder? The Perils and Benefits of Empirical
Research in International Investment Arbitration, 12 S ANTA C LARA J. INT’L L. 263, 266 (2013) (“The
increasing reliance on empirical data in legal scholarship focused on international investment
arbitration is recent.”); Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment
Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 767, 775–78 (2008) (discussing trends in empirical
research in international arbitration).
88. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1947).
89. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208, 301–307.
90. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 173(f) (regarding arbitration under the LRMA).
91. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers. v.
Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960).
92. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct.
1612 (2018). The Pyett decision was the first major Supreme Court case to rely on the FAA in
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I read and coded each case. A research assistant also read
approximately 45% of the case to ensure quality. The research assistant
was assigned two tasks: (1) to determine whether the case interpreted the
FAA; and (2) if so, to code the case for tools of statutory interpretation.
For the first task, my research assistant and I agreed 100% of the time on
cases that should be within the dataset. As to the second, we agreed over
70% of the time when we coded independently. Most of our
disagreements concerned whether or which canon applied. Given the
nuanced distinctions I was making regarding canon use, I was not
particularly concerned about the number of disagreements in our
independent coding. 93 After consultation, we used a consensus model to
determine the proper coding for each case. 94 To the extent that I changed
individual case coding based on this process, I would go back through the
database to ensure consistency across cases.
I employed a coding system like Professors Krishnakumar, Brudney,
Distlear, and Schacter. I collected basic information for each case,
including case name, year, author, class action status, opinion type
(majority, dissent, etc.), and the number of signatories for each opinion. 95
When I aggregated the data, I used the label “concurring opinion” for any
opinion that was not a majority and not a dissent. 96 I did not record each
Justice’s vote on each case.
I collected data regarding the type of question considered by the
Court. I collected this data in two ways. First, I collected the statute
numbers for each part of the FAA interpreted by the Court. Second, I
coded each opinion for its arbitration subject matter by placing it into one
of the following categories: (1) preemption; (2) arbitrability; (3)
jurisdiction; (4) award review; (5) conflicting federal statutes; or (6) other.
deciding a case involving a collective bargaining agreement. See Roger B. Jacobs, Supreme Court
Tips Against Individual Rights—Again, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. J. 267, 280 (2010) (relying upon
Gilmer, the Court found no reason to distinguish between agreements signed by unions or by
individuals so long as those agreements were ‘clear and unmistakable.”). Prior to that time, the Court
relied more heavily on labor law to decide those cases; since Pyett, the Court appears to have blended
both labor law and law under the FAA to decide these cases.
93. My research assistant worked for me between her first and second years of law school and,
therefore, had not had the opportunity to take a course on statutory interpretation. While I trained her
for coding and provided her with my codebook, her relatively untrained eye relating to the various
types of canons of construction led to most of our initial disagreements in coding.
94. The purpose of the exercise was to ensure accuracy of results, not to validate the coding
methodology. The coding labels leave some room for interpretation by the coder, so comparing notes
and consulting on different ideas seemed prudent to ensure the most accurate data possible.
95. I include a copy of my codebook as Appendix A.
96. This relatively small category (21 separate opinions) includes true concurring opinions, as
well as one plurality opinion, five partially concurring/partially dissenting opinions, and one part
majority/part concurring opinions.
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The “other” category captured cases such as Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.
of America, determining the meaning of “in commerce” in Section 2, and
Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, interpreting a definition of
“employment” in Section 1. 97 I did not code any tools of statutory
interpretation discussed solely in the case’s procedural history, i.e., I did
not code references to tools of statutory interpretation by the lower courts
as summarized by the Supreme Court.
In arbitration literature, the term arbitrability often includes two sets
of cases, which I coded separately. The first category of cases I captured
as “arbitrability” follows the line of Prima Paint and considers whether
courts or arbitrators make certain determinations, such as the applicability
of a defense. 98 The second category I coded considers whether disputes
that fall within the protection of federal statutes may be arbitrated at all.
This second line of cases begins with Wilko v. Swan, and I coded them as
“conflicts” with other federal law. 99 I only coded the tools used to interpret
the FAA and not any other statute involved in the case, as to not muddy
the data between tools used to interpret the FAA and tools used to interpret
other statutes. For instance, in cases such as 14 Penn Plaza, I only coded
the portions relating to the FAA, and I did not code portions related to the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
I coded thirteen primary interpretive tools. Because the nature of
interpretive tools remained largely consistent for the last 200 years, the
longitudinal nature of this study should not encounter definitional
inconsistencies over time. 100 I coded for the following: (1) the text or plain
meaning; (2) the whole act rule; (3) other federal statutes; (4) Supreme
Court precedent; (5) dictionary definitions; (6) grammar, or syntactic,
canons; (7) language canons; (8) substantive law canons; (9) legislative
history; (10) legislative inaction; (11) practical consequences; 101 (12)
Congress’s intent or purpose; and (13) agency deference. Similar to other
studies in this area, I also imported the Spaeth ideology for the opinions. 102
97. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Cir. City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
98. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 403 (1967) (“Under § 4, with
respect to a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal courts save for the existence of an arbitration
clause, the federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that ‘the making
of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue.’”).
99. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
100. See Baum & Brudney supra note 11 and accompanying text.
101. I also collected data on four subcategories of practical consequences: (1) business
consequences, (2) administrative consequences, (3) absurdities created by an interpretation, and (4)
justice or fairness consequences.
102. Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger &
Sara C. Benesh, 2020 Supreme Court Database Code Book, Version 2020 Release 1
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Within the category of legislative history, I separately captured the type
of legislative history, notably: committee reports, debate statements,
statements made at a hearing by a Congressperson, and statements made
at a hearing by a witness. For some categories, I separated arbitrationrelated tools from general tools. For instance, I captured both FAA and
non-FAA precedent, as well as the arbitration canon separate from other
substantive canons.
As noted above, scholars employed varying methods on whether and
how to capture the Court’s reliance on a particular tool. 103 I attempted to
take a middle ground by coding one of three levels for each tool. I coded
a “0” if the opinion did not reference it, a “1” if it was referenced but not
relied on (including if the court rejected the tool), and a “2” if the opinion
relied on the tool. This coding method preserves a level of granularity that
is both inclusive and discriminating. The coding is inclusive because it
picks up all references to a tool; it is discriminating because it judges
whether or not the opinion relies on the tool. i. Human coding allows this
level granularity, whereas AI data analysis or keyword searching cannot
make these distinctions.
Prior to discussing the results of this study, a few words about the
limitations of this data are in order. First, the dataset is relatively small,
involving only fifty-one unique cases over eighty-five years. To create a
richer data set, I coded for a large number of tools that fall within the
major theories of statutory interpretation.
The data does not show any meaningful patterns when looking at
individual years. However, grouping the cases by decade shows case
trends despite the number of opinions varying from one decade to the next.
For most purposes, I grouped the data by decade starting at 1980; all cases
decided before 1980 appeared in their own group. I chose this start date
because the Supreme Court decided key cases in the 1980s, which led to
an explosion of arbitration law. Specifically, the 1984 case of Southland
v. Keating and the 1989 case of Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express 104 opened the way to enforcing contractual
arbitration agreements between companies and individuals. Chart 1 shows
the volume of cases and opinions for each decade.

http://supremecourtdatabase.org/_brickFiles/2020_01/SCDB_2020_01_codebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UFL7-697K].
103. See supra Section II.B.
104. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp.,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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Chart 1

A second limitation to this study is my familiarity with most of the
cases in the dataset. I do not approach this data with fresh eyes. I have
written about and taught many of these cases, and I have preexisting ideas
regarding how the Court has trended over time. I employed a research
assistant to help check any biases I brought to the project.
I designed this study to be comparable with other studies in the
literature; however, the subjective nature of human coding causes some
limited variation across studies. Consider, for example, the case of EEOC
v. Waffle House. When Professors Brudney and Distlear coded this case,
they reported reliance on the text, Supreme Court precedent, and
legislative inaction; they recorded citation, but no reliance on purpose and
the arbitration canon. 105 When I coded the case, I coded reliance on the
text, Supreme Court precedent, and practical considerations. I also coded
citation, but not reliance on the arbitration canon. One reason for the
difference in spotting legislative inaction and purpose is that those tools
could have been used to code the court’s interpretation of Title VII, not

105. Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 26 (discussing coding of the EEOC v. Waffle
House case).
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the FAA, which would not be recorded in my data. 106 My coding of
practical consequences was based on the Court’s discussion of the
potential for a double-recovery in these cases involving both EEOC
proceedings and arbitration, but I may have coded this case with a slightly
heavier hand than Professors Brudney and Distlear. 107
Despite my familiarity with the subject area and the data underlying
this study (i.e., the Supreme Court cases), I had never systematically read
the cases focused specifically on tools of statutory interpretation. My
primary purpose of this study was to be exploratory, observe trends in the
data, and ultimately look for surprising patterns. I also entered this project
with an open mind regarding how the arbitration data may compare to
other scholars’ data and conclusions.
I began the study with certain hypotheses. I expected to find that the
use of legislative history would be more prominent in the early decades
interpreting the FAA compared with the last thirty years for two reasons:
(1) purposivism was the predominant theory used by the Supreme Court
before the appointment of Justice Scalia; and (2) more tools may have
been necessary to interpret the statute earlier in time, and the precedential
effect of those early determinations may make references to that history
unnecessary. 108 In addition, given the Court’s repeated description of the
FAA as an “anomaly,” I did not expect the Court to use many tools
comparing the FAA to other legislation or relying on non-FAA
precedent. 109 I also expected to see an increased reliance on the
“arbitration canon” developed by the Court in the 1980s. 110
V. RESULTS
This part considers the tools used in the opinions, focusing on how
the tools relate to the judicial philosophies of textualism, purposivism, and
106. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 285 (2002) (“Congress has directed the EEOC
to exercise the same enforcement powers, remedies, and procedures that are set forth in Title
VII. . . .”); id at 288 (describing changes to the law that did not include any reference to arbitration,
which is indicative of legislative inaction).
107. Id. at 296–98 (discussing the possibility of a double recovery for an employee and how such
recovery can be avoided).
108. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History:
Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 B ERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 143–45, tbl.6 (2008)
[hereinafter, Legislative History] (reporting on a “Scalia Effect”).
109. See, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009) (labeling the FAA as an
“anomaly” because the law is substantive with preemptive power yet does not confer subject-matter
jurisdiction on the federal courts); Hall St. Assoc. LLC v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 581–82 (2008).
110. See infra note 151–54 and accompanying text for additional explanation of the arbitration
canon and its variations.
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intentionalism. This section is organized by giving a general summary of
results, followed by a discussion of the Court’s reliance on precedent, and
then a discussion of the tools associated with the different philosophies.
As appropriate, I compare my results with the work of previous scholars
discussed above in the literature review.
A.

Summary of Results

Considering the raw data, the Court relies on some tools more than
others. Majority, dissenting, and other opinions have patterns of their own.
Table 1 breaks down the percentage reliance on each tool overall and by
opinion type. Table 1 also shows the chi-square analysis results for
pairwise comparisons of individual tools across the type of opinion (e.g.,
majority v. dissent). The data show that the Court has a clear preference
for relying on the text of the FAA and prior FAA precedent, and those
rates of reliance become more pronounced in majority opinions.
Perhaps the most interesting item from Table 1 is the use of the
arbitration canon. Majority opinions rely on the arbitration canon in 47%
of cases, while dissents and concurrences do not. Comparing the
arbitration canon to other substantive canons is equally interesting. While
majority opinions rely on the arbitration canon in roughly half of the cases,
majority opinions rarely invoke other canons. However, dissenting and
concurring opinions are twice as likely to invoke a substantive canon
other than the arbitration canon. The chi-squared analysis indicates a
statistical significance in the use of the arbitration canon across opinion
types, but it indicates no significance regarding other canon use.
Table 1
Percent Reliance on Tools of Interpretation
by Opinion Type
Tool of Interpretation

Text / Plain Meaning

Majority &

Dissenting

Concurring and

All

Per Curium Opinions

Opinions

Other Opinions

Opinions

(n.50)

(n.43)

(n.21)

(n.114)

86.0% AB***, AC***

46.5% AB***, BC

28.6% AC***,

60.5%

BC
Whole Act Rule

38.0% AB**, AC*

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss1/3
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Other Federal Statutes

14.0% AB, AC

11.6% AB, BC

4.8% AC, BC

11.4%

FAA Supreme Court

86.0% AB***, AC**

44.2% AB***, BC

52.4% AC**, BC

64.0%

48.0% AB, AC

32.6% AB, BC

28.6% AC, BC

38.6%

Dictionaries

2.0% AB, AC

0.0% AB

0.0% AC

.9%

Grammar Canons

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Language Canons

14.0% AB, AC

7.0% AB, BC

4.8% AC, BC

9.6%

Arbitration Canon

46.0% AB***, AC**

7.0% AB***, BC

4.8% AC**, BC

23.7%

Non-Arbitration

8.0% AB, AC

14.0% AB, BC

19.0% AC, BC

12.3%

12.0% AB, AC

20.9% AB, BC

4.8% AC, BC

14.0%

Legislative Inaction

4.0% AB, AC

4.7% AB, BC

0.0% AC, BC

3.5%

Practical

56.0% AB, AC*

39.5% AB, BC

28.6% AC*, BC

44.7%

44.0% AB, AC*

51.2% AB, BC**

14.3% AC*,

41.2%

Precedent
Non-FAA Supreme
Court Precedent

Substantive Canon
Legislative History
(Combined)

Considerations
Intent or Purpose

BC**
Agency Deference

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Superscripts are used to indicate the significance of Chi-squared tests results
for pairwise comparisons between pairs of columns for separate types of
opinions.
“AB” indicates the significance of results for the pairwise comparison for
Column A (Majority & Per Curium Opinions) and Column B (Dissenting
Opinions).
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“AC” indicates the significance of results for the pairwise comparison for
Column A (Majority & Per Curium Opinions) and Column C (Concurring and
Other Opinions).
“BC” indicates the significance of results for the pairwise comparison for
Column B (Dissenting Opinions) and Column C (Concurring and Other
Opinions).
No asterisks indicate a p-value higher than 0.05, i.e. no statistical significance.
* indicates a p-value between 0.05 and 0.01.
** indicate a p-value of 0.01 and 0.001.
*** indicate a p-value below 0.001.

When I compare this arbitration data to other studies, a trend shows
overreliance on three key tools, particularly in majority opinions: the FAA
text/plain meaning, FAA precedent, and the arbitration canon. The result
of such overreliance is the creation of an insular body of case law that
increasingly expands the reach of the FAA. The FAA’s expansion has
become controversial, as shown by a growing number of concurring and
dissenting opinions, as well as closer vote counts. The other interesting
trend is the increased reliance on a higher number of tools in the last
decade. Chart 2 indicates the average and median number of tools used in
an opinion by decade. Of note is the increase in the median number of
tools in the 2010s. An increase in the use of tools may indicate frustration
with existing precedent and justices searching for a new interpretation of
an old statute.
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Chart 2

Number of Tools by Decade and Opinion
Types
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Average

B.

Median

Reliance on Prior Precedent

Justice Stevens astutely noted that “the court is standing on its own
shoulders” by relying on its own precedent to expand the FAA. 111 Justice
O’Connor similarly referred to the Court’s FAA rulings as an “edifice of
its own creation.” 112 These observations are confirmed in my data, and
even more so in the last two decades. Among all opinions, 64% of cases
relied on a prior FAA case to interpret the FAA, 12% of cases mentioned
but did not rely on a prior FAA case, and 24% of opinions did not rely on
a prior FAA case at all. 113 These rates of reliance are the highest compared
to all other tools. Majority opinions rely on prior FAA cases at a rate of
86% and dissents at a rate of only 44%. In other words, majority opinions
111. Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001) (Stevens, dissenting). This phrase
appears to be a nod to the phrase “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants,” first attributed to Bernard de
Chartres. Although the classic phrase refers to the role of building on prior wisdom, Justice Stevens
uses the phrase tongue-in-cheek to depict the court relying on itself.
112. See Allied–Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, concurring )
(“Yet, over the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent
with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own
creation.”).
113. Twenty-seven opinions do not cite any FAA precedent. Of those twenty-seven cases, only
six of them are majority or per curium opinions, thirteen are dissents, and the remaining nine opinions
are concurrences and other opinions. Given the terse nature of many dissents and concurrences, the
lack of reliance on previous arbitration cases is understandable.
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are twice as likely to rely on prior FAA precedent than dissents. This
phenomenon is statistically significant. Rarely is FAA precedent
dismissed or rejected— only 12% of total opinions. When FAA precedent
was rejected, it occurred overwhelmingly in dissenting opinions (twelve
of the fifteen instances). The sole majority opinion rejecting a prior FAA
case was Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, which was decided in
1956. This opinion rejected an arbitration case from the 1930s relying on
an interpretation of the FAA no longer suppored under the Erie
Doctrine. 114
Reliance on FAA precedent becomes even more prevalent over time.
Chart 3 presents this data by decade. Two items are worth noting. First,
the lowest numbers of reliance on FAA precedent understandably
occurred before 1980 because the precedent was still being developed.
During the 1980s and 1990s, overall reliance on prior cases was at an alltime high. Not a single majority opinion rejected prior FAA precedent
since 1956. The overwhelming support for FAA precedent in the 1980s
and 1990s is explainable in the historical context of the wider alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) movement. The 1976 “Pound Conference”
articulated significant problems with litigation and touted the various
alternative processes, explaining the possibility that those ADR processes
might yield more efficient and more satisfying results to disputes. 115 This
enthusiasm included a preference for arbitration over court processes,
partly based on the admirable interests of party autonomy and
efficiency. 116
This enthusiasm has simultaneously grown and waned in the
twentieth century, resulting in a split based primarily on politically
ideological lines. The increased use of arbitration agreements has drawn
criticism from the Court and the scholarly community. 117 Given this
114. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956) (citing Shanferoke
Coal & Supply Corp. of Del. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1935)).
115. See Kristen M. Blankley, Ashley M. Votruba, Logen M. Bartz & Lisa M. PytlikZillig, ADR
is Not a Household Term: Considering Ethical and Practical Consequences of the Public’s Lack of
Understanding of Mediation and Arbitration, 99 NEB. L. R EV. 797, 798 (2021) (discussing the history
of the Pound Conference); see also Lara Traum & Brian Farkas, The History and Legacy of the Pound
Conferences, 18 C ARDOZO J. C ONFLICT R ESOL. 677, 683–86 (2017) (providing information on the
history and purposes of the Pound Conference).
116. See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. R EV.
1119, 1145–47 (2019) (noting the expansion of judicial support for arbitration following the Pound
Conference).
117. See Imre Szalai, The Failure of Legal Ethics to Address the Abuses of Forced Arbitration,
24 HARV. NEGOT. L. R EV. 127, 141 (2018) (“With the spread of arbitration, society also loses the
many benefits of having reported, public judicial decisions, such as the punitive and deterrent effects
on wrongdoers and potential wrongdoers and the development, pronouncement, and clarification of
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background, one might expect that the increased rejection of FAA
precedent comes from the liberal members of the bench. However, the
Court’s modern liberal justices have rejected FAA precedent on several
occasions: Justice Ginsberg (three cases), Justice Stevens (one case),
Justice Breyer (one case), and Justice Sotomayor (one case). The more
surprising finding, however, is the “Thomas Effect.” In six cases, Justice
Thomas filed a dissenting opinion based on his belief that the Federal
Arbitration Act “does not apply to proceedings in state courts.”118 Four of
these occurrences are in dissenting opinions, breaking from other
conservative colleagues. 119
Chart 3

Case Reliance on FAA by Decade
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Pre 1980s

1980s
Rely

1990s
Reject

2000s

2010s

Neither

Overall, the reliance on prior FAA cases depicts a small, selfcontained world of arbitration precedent. Indeed, while 64% (seventythree opinions) of total opinions rely on FAA cases, only 36% (forty-one
legal doctrines which can serve as a published guide to others.”); Richard Chernick, “ADR” Comes
of Age: What Can We Expect in the Future?, 4 P EPP. DISP. R ESOL. L.J. 187, 190 (2004) (discussing
the business community’s increased preference for arbitration following favorable Supreme Court
rulings); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 72 TUL. L. R EV. 1, 4–5 (1997) (discussing the downsides of increased use of
arbitration, including waiver of jury rights and trial protections).
118. Dr’s Assocs., Inc. v. Cararotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 460 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J. dissenting); Kindred
Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1429–30 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting); and
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 59 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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opinions) rely on non-FAA Supreme Court precedent to interpret the
FAA. In twenty-six of the forty-one opinions citing outside law, the Court
relied on FAA and another type of precedent to interpret the FAA. These
patterns show that the Court relies on itself more and more over time to
determine the meaning of the statute.
Comparing reliance on Supreme Court precedent between this and
other studies is difficult because the numbers other scholars report for this
category vary widely. Professor Staudt’s research shows a low reliance on
precedent, around 35%, which will be explored in more detail below. 120
Professors Brudney and Ditslear report reliance on Supreme Court
precedent considerably higher, around 81%. 121 Professor Krishnakumar’s
most recent cumulative study shows reliance on precedent in the middle
of these two, around 57%. 122 These differences may result from coding
and methodological variances.
Given the varying questions the previous studies sought to answer,
only a few of them separated controlling versus noncontrolling precedent.
Studies not limited by subject area were less likely to consider whether
prior precedent was under the same statute or had stare decisis effect.
Other studies explicitly answer this question, but with conflicting results,
again making comparisons with this study difficult. 123
Consider Professor Staudt’s study. Her research team reaches a
similar conclusion—justices rely primarily on judge-made law compared
to other types of tools, including the plain meaning of the text and
legislative history. Her study concluded: “Our investigation also suggests
that the justices are often willing to allocate power and discretion to
themselves, not as co-equal partners, but rather, as the only relevant
players in the interpretive game.” 124 Her study, like this one, involves a
limited subject matter (tax), which may make the determination of
controlling v. noncontrolling precedent easier for coders. 125 The Staudt
study’s rate of “reliance” on past precedent at only 35% appears to be due

120. Staudt et al., supra note 65, at 1955 (reporting reliance on Supreme Court precedent in tax
cases). See infra notes 124–27124127 and accompanying text.
121. Warp and Woof, supra note 21, at 1253 (showing relatively equal rates of reliance on
Supreme Court precedent for tax and employment cases).
122. Backdoor Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1297 (chart showing rates of reliance).
123. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 66, at 165 (“Justice Scalia follows case law that interpreted
the same statute or a similar statute when interpreting statutes about a third of the time in my sample
[of dissenting opinions].”).
124. Staudt, et al., supra note 6565, at 1953.
125. Id. (“In reading the tax cases, it was apparent that the Court regularly relied on judge-made
rules for purposes of interpreting the tax code.”)

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss1/3

28

Blankley: Federal Arbitration Act

2022]

F EDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

129

to coding issues. 126 Staudt’s study appears to have a higher burden of what
constitutes “reliance” than other scholars because her study required the
prior case to be a “basis” of the decision. 127 Ultimately, what is notable
for this paper is that reliance on Supreme Court precedent is the most
frequently used tool of interpretation, consistent with the majority of the
literature in the field. 128
C.

Textualist Tools

This section considers the textualist tools used by the Court in
deciding arbitration cases. This part begins with a discussion of the use of
the text or plain meaning of a statute, followed by the use of canons of
interpretation, dictionaries, and other textualist tools.
1. Text or Plain Meaning
The tool with the second-highest rate of reliance by the Court is the
statutory text. Justices relied on the text in 59.6% of all opinions. Unlike
other tools, the text was rarely rejected or cited without use. I coded only
two opinions (1.8%) in which the text was cited but not substantively
relied on, one unanimous opinion and one dissent. 129 In the remaining
38.5% of cases the text was not cited at all. Majority and per curium
decisions overwhelmingly relied on the text of the FAA, at 84.0%.
Dissenting opinions relied on the text in just under half of the opinions, or
46.5%. Concurring and other opinions were least likely to rely on the text,
at 28.6%.
Over time, the reliance on text appears to coincide with the increased
conservative nature of the Court. Following the lead of other scholars, I
126. Id. at 1955 (“Overall, the Court used precedent in this manner in 35.02 percent (n=347) of
the 991 tax cases; and in over a third of the 347 cases (n=118), precedent was the only rationale the
Court gave for its decision.”).
127. Id. at 1954 (“Beginning with precedent, our protocols called for us to code cases in which
the majority opinion writer asserted that a prior ruling served as a, or the, basis for interpretation (mere
citations were insufficient).”).
128. See Backdoor Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1297–98 (chart showing rates of reliance with
precedent reliance as the highest); Warp and Woof, supra note 21, at 1253 (showing overall reliance
rates with precedent as the highest).
129. In Mosely v. Elec. & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167, 172–73 (1963), Chief Justice
Warren’s concurrence states hypothetically and without further explanation: “Can the Arbitration Act,
in light of its language and legislative history, be applied to laborers and materialmen or to
construction projects subject to the Miller Act?” In First Options of Chi. Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938
(1955), the unanimous, majority opinions cites a number of FAA provisions but without any
discussion of the text. See id. at 942 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10 in a see, e.g. citation); id. at 948 (citing 9
U.S.C. § 16 but relying on other precedent, not the text, in determining the outcome).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 55 [], Iss. 1, Art. 3

130

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

[55:101

utilized the Spaeth Database as a starting point for delineating whether an
opinion was “conservative” or “liberal.” 130 Chart 4 displays the
percentage use of reliance on text over time, comparing all opinions with
majority and dissenting opinions. Chart 5 provides a comparison of the
percentages of cases in each decade with a conservative or liberal rating
in the Spaeth database, with additional lines for my revised assessment of
whether the case was liberal or conservative-leaning. I changed the
political ideology of nine cases (five from liberal to conservative and four
from conservative to liberal), with an overall net gain of one conservative
case. 131 Under the adjusted ideology labels, the Supreme Court’s overall
ideology was more conservative than liberal during each decade studied.
The parallels are notable. Decades marked by high reliance on the
text of the FAA also tend to lead to conservative case outcomes. The
Court’s opinions in the 1980s and 2010s show a high reliance on the text
and a related high rate of conservative outcomes. By contrast, the 1990s
involved the lowest levels of reliance on the text, and the percentage of
liberal-leaning cases is much higher than the 1980s and 2020s. Although
the trends are not exact, they are noticeable. Because the FAA is
historically a business piece of legislation championed by the Chamber of
Commerce and other business interests, the apparent correlation between
the text- and business-friendly or “conservative” outcomes should be
unsurprising.

130. See, e.g., Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1718–19 (describing variables, including items
used from the Spaeth database); Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 21 (relying on ideologies
for individual Justices from the Spaeth database); Legislative History, supra note 108, at 130–31;
Anita Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. C HI . L. R EV. 825, 845 (2017)
[hereinafter Reconsidering] (“In order to minimize errors and to make this study as replicable as
possible, I coded for ideology by importing the ideological-direction coding from Professor Harold
Spaeth’s Supreme Court Database for the cases in my data set.”); Spaeth, et al., supra note 102.
131. For instance, I coded as conservative two preemption cases that the Spaeth database listed
as liberal. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (preempting state administrative scheme that
did not permit arbitration of cases); Dr’s Assoc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (preempting
consumer protection law regarding arbitration). Conversely, I coded as liberal two cases in which
arbitrators allowed class action procedures within arbitration that was ultimately overruled with
instruction to proceed in bilateral arbitration. See Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013)
(holding that arbitrator did not exceed powers in allowing class arbitration under the terms of the
contract); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion suggesting that
arbitrators may decide whether to permit class arbitration in the first instance).
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Chart 4
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The arbitration findings here show a slightly higher reliance rate on
the text than other studies. Professor Krishnakumar’s study over the first
eleven years of the Roberts Court shows reliance at a rate of 47.4% across
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all opinions. 132 In Professors Brudney and Dislear’s study of workplace
cases from 1986 to 2002, they found that 55.1% of all opinions relied on
the statute’s text. 133 In a different study, these authors reported a text
reliance rate of 66.5% in tax cases and 60.6% in workplace cases,
demonstrating that some areas of law may see higher reliance on the text
than others. 134
The FAA text reliance rate of 59.6% is comparable with the 60.6%
of text reliance in the Brudney and Distlear workplace dataset. One reason
for the high rate of reliance on the text may be that the FAA is a simpler
statute to interpret, and the text’s plain meaning is easy to determine based
on the words Congress used. The statute is short, and it does not use
technical language, so reliance on the plain meaning might be more
appropriate in this situation compared to statutes that are more complex
or technical.
2. Linguistic Canons of Interpretation
Following Professor Krishakumar’s lead, I separately coded
grammar, language, and substantive canons. 135 I also separately coded for
the arbitration canon. In my analysis, not one opinion referenced pure
grammar or punctuation canon, whereas other scholars found varying, but
low, use of grammar and punctuation canons. 136
The Court similarly relies on linguistic canons with less frequency
than other scholars observed. Justices relied on or cited linguistic canons
in twelve opinions, or 10.5% of all opinions. Of those, half (or six)
appeared in majority opinions, five in dissenting opinions, and the
remaining one in a concurrence. When cited, the linguistic canon was
nearly always relied on (twelve of fourteen appearances). The two
instances in which the canon was rejected were both in dissents, in cases
involving “dueling canons.” 137 The two most common canons referenced,
although not always by name, were ejusdem generis and the canon against

132. Backdoor Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1297.
133. Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 30 tbl.1.
134. Warp and Woof, supra note 21, at 1253.
135. See Roberts Court, supra note 33, at 230; Dueling Canons, supra note 13, at 924; Backdoor
Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1293.
136. See Roberts Court, supra note 3, at 236 (reporting an overall use of grammar canons at
5.1%); Staudt, et al., supra note 65, at 1935 (reporting punctuation/grammar canons at under .05%
for tax decisions); Mendelson, supra note 9, at 102 (“Meanwhile, some of the grammatical and
punctuation canons were among the least frequently engaged.”).
137. Dueling Canons, supra note 13, at 912 (defining a dueling canon as one in which a majority
or concurring opinion reaches an opposite conclusion as a dissent using the same canon).
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surplusage. 138 Both instances of dueling canons involved the application
of ejusdem generis. 139
Among arbitration scholars, the most recognizable and impactful use
of ejusdem generis can be found in the Court’s interpretation of FAA
Section 1 in Circuit City v. Adams. 140 Section 1 provides that “nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.” 141 The Circuit City case interpreted the last clause,
i.e., what constitutes “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.” The plaintiff argued that the FAA did not apply to
his age discrimination claim because his work at defendant Circuit City’s
store fell within the exception as a class of workers engaged in interstate
commerce. 142 In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court
rejected this argument and instead applied ejusdem generis, holding that
the catchall phrase was limited to transportation workers. 143 Justice
Souter dissented, arguing that the canon’s use was inapplicable because
of the practical considerations of the 1920s when many employment cases
fell outside the FAA. 144 This case opened the door to enforce nearly all
arbitration agreements in employment contracts. 145 The timing of the case
138. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1428–29 (2017)
(applying a linguistic canon to give effect to all words in the statute); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 355 (2011) (applying a canon similar in operation to the surplusage canon
in requiring that the Court must give effect to all of the words in the statute); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc.
v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 81 (2010) (applying a language canon to give effect to all words in the
statute).
139. See Hall St. Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (relying on ejusdem generis
to determine if the categories of judicial review in Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA are exclusive); id.
at 594–95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting the application of ejusdem generis); Cir. City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114 (2001) (relying on the canon of ejusdem generis to determine the
meaning of a catch-all category of employees); id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
application of ejusdem generis). Professors Brudney and Ditslear analyzed the specific use of
linguistic canons in the Circuit City case, concluding that “promoting a coherent interaction between
the FAA’s coverage and exemption provisions, it seems impossible to view the majority’s linguistic
analysis as so obviously correct that it renders irrelevant any consideration of legislative intent.”
Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 88.
140. Cir. City, 532 U.S. 105.
141. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947) (emphasis added).
142. See Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 113–14 (outlining Adams’ reading of Section 1).
143. See id. at 114–15 (applying canon).
144. See id. at 139–40 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing historical context and arguing that
resort to the canon was unnecessary).
145. See, e.g., Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Employment as Transaction, 39 S ETON HALL L. REV.
447, 470 (2009) (“These decisions allow employers to insist on ex ante agreements to submit any
employment claims, including those arising under federal discrimination statutes, to private
resolution.”); Jonathan H. Peyton, What Arbitration Clause? The “Appropriate” Standard for
Measuring Notice of Binding Arbitration to an Employee, 36 S UFFOLK U. L. R EV. 745, 746 (2003)
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also falls in line with the shift in textualist tools and conservative-leaning
cases.
Compared to other studies, the rate of citation and reliance on
grammar and other linguistic canons is low. 146 The data also shows fewer
canons used than other studies. 147 Even when combined with the whole
act rule, the FAA reliance on linguistic tools remains low. 148 One
explanation may be that the Court’s reliance on its own FAA precedent
and text is so high. 149 In other words, the Court continues to expand the
reach of the FAA from case to case and refuses to take a fresh look at the
text.
3. Substantive Canons of Interpretation
For substantive canons, I separately coded the arbitration canon from
the others. 150 The arbitration canon first arose in the 1983 case of Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction, Co. when the Court
declared: “Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements.” 151 By 1989, the Court
generalized the policy as “federal policy favoring arbitration,” and in
1990, Professor Eskridge characterized the arbitration canon as an
“established” policy, while other scholars believe the canon is in
development. 152
(“Furthermore, employers will most likely continue to utilize arbitration to resolve employee claims
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, which approved
the enforcement of arbitration clauses found in employment contracts.”)
146. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 9, at 101 (finding that the expression unius canon appeared
in 18.6% of the dataset of contested statutory issues); Roberts Court, supra note 33, at 236 (reporting
use of linguistic canons in over 5% of the dataset).
147. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 9, at 101 (depicting a variety of canons utilized in the
dataset); Backdoor Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1305 (“Perhaps the most interesting doctrinal
discovery is that the textualist and textualist-leaning Justices on the Roberts Court regularly used two
tried-and-true textualist canons, noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, to infer an underlying statutory
purpose.”).
148. See infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text. Many scholars combine the grammar
canons with the linguistic canons and the whole act rule, among other tools. See, Mendelson, supra
note 9, at 101 (using an inclusive list of canons that include the whole act rule, as well as substantive
canons); Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 12–13 (noting that the whole act rule is one of the
most commonly applied linguistic canons in employment cases).
149. See supra Section IV.B (prior precedent) and Section IV.C.1 (reliance on text).
150. Substantive canons are “principles and presumptions that judges have created to protect
important background norms derived from the Constitution, common-law practices, or policies
related to particular subject areas.” Reconsidering, supra note 130, at 833.
151. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 24 (1983) (emphasis
added).
152. Volt Inf. Scis., Inc. v Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989).
William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 27 UCLA L. R EV. 621, 664 (1990) (“For example, the
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The Court cites the arbitration canon more than all other substantive
canons combined. Twenty-seven opinions, or 23.7% of opinions, relied
on the arbitration canon, and another thirteen opinions, or 11.4% of all
opinions, referenced but did not rely on it. Among majority opinions,
twenty-three separate cases, or 46.0% of all cases, relied on the canon,
thus building the canon over time. On the other hand, seven of the thirteen
opinions rejecting the use of the arbitration canon are dissenting opinions.
These numbers indicate that while the Court, through its majority
opinions, appears to have established the arbitration canon, its use is
controversial, particularly with Justice Stevens, who rejected its use in six
different opinions.
My hypothesis that reliance on the arbitration canon would steadily
increase over time was not borne out. Although the frequency of citation
to the arbitration canon increases slightly over time (except for the small
caseload in the1990s), the percentage of reliance on the arbitration canon
appears to be decreasing. The 1980s saw the greatest percentage reliance
on the arbitration canon, with 36.8% of all opinions in that decade relying
on it. The percentage dipped to 23% in the 1990s, increased to 27.9% in
the 2000s, and fell slightly to 25.7% in the 2010s. In addition, the sheer
number of opinions rejecting or not relying on the arbitration canon is
increasing both in absolute numbers and percentage of opinions. Table 2
provides both the counts and percentages associated with the use of the
arbitration canon. Perhaps the reason for the high rate of reliance on the
arbitration canon in the 1980s was to establish this new canon. As the
arbitration cases have become more controversial, reliance decreased in
percentage of cases, but it appears more frequently. The controversial
nature of the canon is shown through the increased rejection of its use,
particularly in the 2000s and 2010s.

canon favoring arbitration is now an established proceduralist policy of the Court.”); see also Canons
of Construction, supra note 20, at 26 (noting that the Court relied on the substantive arbitration canon
in the EEOC v. Waffle House decision). See Mendelson, supra note 9, at 121 (describing the
arbitration canon as “fledgling”); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasing Odd
Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. R EV. 796,
818 (2012) (“These factors suggest that there is not a strong national consensus in favor of
arbitration.”).
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Table 2

Decade
Pre-1980s
1980s
1990s
2000s
2010s

Reliance
– Count
0
7
3
8
9

Rejection
– Count
0
2
2
4
6

Reliance –
Percentage
0%
36.8%
23.0%
27.9%
25.7%

Rejection Percentage
0%
10.5%
15.4%
13.8%
14.3%

The Court cites the arbitration canon far more frequently than any
other canon, as depicted in Chart 6. Other substantive canons occurring in
the data include the presumption against implied repeal, the harmonious
reading of statutes (appearing in six opinions, twice in a “dueling”
manner), 153 and canons relating to federalism and preemption (appearing
in four opinions). 154 The cases citing canon use are primarily in the

153. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (“Our rules aiming for harmony
over conflict in statutory interpretation grow from an appreciation that it’s the job of Congress by
legislation, not this Court by supposition, both to write the laws and to repeal them.”); id. at 1646
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Enacted later in time, the NLRA should qualify as ‘an implied repeal’ of
the FAA, to the extent of any genuine conflict.”); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer,
515 U.S. 528, 533 (1995) (applying doctrine against implied repeal between FAA and Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act); id. at 555 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“According to the Court of Appeals, reading
COGSA to invalidate foreign arbitration clauses would conflict directly with the terms and policy of
the FAA. Unfortunately, in adopting a contrary reading to avoid this conflict, the Court has today
deprived COGSA § 3(8) of much of its force.”); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 20 (1984)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Repeals by implication are of course not
favored, and we did not suggest that Congress had intended to repeal or modify the substantive scope
of the Arbitration Act in passing the Securities Act.”); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 467–68 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“I would add that the Court, in thus deriving
power from the unrevealing words of the Taft-Hartley Act, has also found that Congress ‘by
implication’ repealed its own statutory exemption of collective-bargaining agreements in the
Arbitration Act, an exemption made as we have seen for well-defined reasons of policy.”).
154. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 367 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“But federalism is as much a question of deeds as words. It often takes the form of a concrete decision
by this Court that respects the legitimacy of a State’s action in an individual case. Here, recognition
of that federalist ideal, embodied in specific language in this particular statute, should lead us to
uphold California’s law, not to strike it down.”); Allied–Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing traditions for dealing with preemption); id. at
292 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Even if the interstate commerce requirement raises uncertainty about
the original meaning of the statute, we should resolve the uncertainty in light of core principles of
federalism.); Volt Inf. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. Of Trs. Of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
(1989) (“The FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.”).
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Court’s FAA preemption cases. 155 One unexpected result in this data is
that only one opinion relied on both the arbitration canon and an
additional substantive canon. 156 Overall, the Supreme Court cited
substantive, nonarbitration canons in 12.3% of opinions, which is similar
to the numbers reported by other scholars. 157
The selective use of canons in the Court’s arbitration preemption
docket lends credence to the idea that the Court may be using textualist
tools to reach a desired outcome. In other areas of the Court’s preemption
jurisprudence, the Court invokes canons to limit the preemptive effect of
federal statutes. 158 None of these canons are cited in the arbitration
preemption cases, and all the cases resulted in preemption of state law.
Instead, the Court is more likely to cite to the arbitration canon to expand
preemptive effect, starting with Southland v Keating. 159 The Southland
case, authored by Justice Burger, utilizes eight unique tools of
interpretation, and plainly states: “In enacting § 2 of the federal Act,
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew
the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”160
The Court then relies on this, and similar language, in six other cases
preempting state law without citing countervailing preemption canons.161

155. See, e.g., William M. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. R EV. 593, 643–44 (1992) (discussing
federalism canons and instances in which the Court favored federalism and those instances in which
the Court favored a national policy protecting individual liberties).
156. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1621 (“The Act, this Court has said, establishes a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”) (internal quotation marks removed); id. at 1624
(invoking the canon to read statutes harmoniously).
157. See, e.g., Reconsidering, supra note 130, at 850 (reporting the Roberts Court’s reliance on
substantive canons at 14.4%); Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 30 (reporting canon use in
11.6% of opinions).
158. C ROSS, supra note 1, at 90 (commenting on various canons and tests to limit preemptive
power and preserve state sovereignty); Mendelson, supra note 9, at 120 (“The Roberts Court has
continued to broaden the federalism canons, announcing that federal statutes will be narrowl y
interpreted if they intrude via overlapping jurisdiction into areas of “traditional” state regulatory
authority.”).
159. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
160. Id. at 10.
161. In chronological order, those cases are: Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (citing
arbitration canon in case preempting a portion of the California Labor Code); Dr’s Assos. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (citing the “equal footing” version of the arbitration canon when
invalidating a portion of Montana’s consumer protection law); Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (citing arbitration canon in case invalidating a portion of Florida’s usury
law); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 343 (2008) (citing arbitration canon in case preemption a portion
of California labor law as promulgated by a California agency); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citing arbitration canon in case preempting California common law in the

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,

37

Akron Law Review, Vol. 55 [], Iss. 1, Art. 3

138

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

[55:101

One could legitimately argue that the 1984 Southland case set the
precedent before the Roberts Court’s resurgence of the federalism canons,
but the absence of discussion of federalism canon may indicate a
substantive preference in picking and choosing among the textualist tools
to achieve a desired outcome.
Chart 6

Canon Reliance
Arbitration
Substantive
Language
Grammar
0.0%

10.0%

20.0%
Rely

30.0%

40.0%

Cite/Reject

4. Other Textualist Tools
A few additional textualist tools are worth noting. I coded twentyseven opinions, or 23.7% of all opinions, as relying on the whole act rule.
An additional five opinions, or 4.4%, cited the whole Act without reliance,
and the remaining eighty-two opinions, or 71.9%, did not reference the
whole act rule at all. Of the cases relying on the whole act rule, nineteen
are majority opinions, or 38.0% of all majority opinions, and six are
dissents, or 14% of all dissents. 162 These numbers are slightly lower than
those reported in Professor Krishnakumar’s most recent article, in which
she reports reliance on the whole act rule for all cases between 2005 and
2016 at 27.0%. 163
area of class actions); Kindred Nursing Cntrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1425 (2017)
(relying on arbitration canon in case preempting a portion of Kentucky law regarding nursing homes).
162. The remaining two opinions citing the whole act rule are concurring opinions.
163. Backdoor Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1313 (“The members of the Roberts Court
referenced whole-act-rule arguments in 27 percent (269 of 995) of the opinions they authored during
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The greatest use of the whole act rule can be found in the Court’s
earliest FAA cases, including four of the first five majority opinions
decided by the Court. 164 Broken down by decade, the percent of opinions
relying on the whole act rule is: 33% before 1980; 11% in the 1980s, 23%
in the 1990s; 31% in the 2000s; and 20% in the 2010s. Justices cited the
whole Act, but did not rely on it, in five majority opinions. Prior to
conducting this analysis, I expected the use of the whole act rule to be
higher. The FAA is a short statute with sections that cross-reference one
another. 165 Perhaps the high rates of reliance on the text and FAA
precedent make resorting to the whole act rule unnecessary.
Finally, dictionary use in FAA cases is low. The court relied on
dictionaries in just one case (.9% of all cases) and rejected the use of a
dictionary in one case (.9% of all cases). The remainder of the cases do
not mention dictionaries at all. In 1995, the Allied–Bruce Terminix v.
Dobson Court used a dictionary from 1933 to determine if the words
involving and affecting are the same in a commerce clause analysis. 166
More recently, Justice Gorsuch rejected the use of a recent Black’s Law
definition of employment to determine that term’s meaning in New Prime
v. Olivera. 167 Otherwise, dictionaries are not mentioned.
Other scholars report higher dictionary usage. For instance, Professor
Krishnakumar cites a 20.5% reliance rate on dictionaries for the Roberts’
Court, while Professors Brudney and Distlear found only 6.3% dictionary
reliance in tax cases and 4.4% in workplace cases. 168 The Warp and Woof
data, however, is more like the FAA data in terms of subject matter
the period between January 31, 2006 and July 1, 2017.”). I followed the lead of Professor
Krishnakumar and recorded the whole act rule separately. Other scholars consider it to fall within
other linguistic canons.
164. In order from earliest to latest: Marine Trans. Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 274–75
(1932) (interpreting Section 8 of the FAA in connection with Section 3); Shanferoke Coal & Supply
Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 449, 452–53 (1935) (interpreting Section 3 in conjunction
with Section 4); The Anaconda v. Am. Sugar Refin. Co., 322 U.S. 42, 45–46 (1944) (interpreting
Section 8 in conjunction with Section 4); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201
(1956) (“Sections 1, 2, and 3 are integral parts of a whole.”).
165. See Kristen M. Blankley, Impact Preemption: A New Theory of Federal Arbitration Act
Preemption, 67 F LA. L. R EV. 711, 720–23 (2015) [hereinafter Impact Preemption] (describing how
the “front end” and “back end” provisions work together within each category).
166. Allied–Bruce Terminix Cos. V. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274 (1995) (The dictionary finds
instances in which “involve” and “affect” sometimes can mean about the same thing.”) (citing
OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY 466 (1st ed. 1933)).
167. New Prime v. Olivera, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (“But this modern intuition isn’t easily
squared with evidence of the term’s meaning at the time of the Act’s adoption in 1925.”).
168. Backdoor Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1297 (citing table data); Roberts Court, supra note
3, at 236 (citing 18.5% reliance on dictionary definitions in the first three years of the Roberts Court);
Warp and Woof, supra note 21, at 1253; see also Choi, supra note 17, at 397 (finding that “in many
recent years, the IRS made almost no reference to . . . dictionaries.”).
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limitations over a much longer period. Importantly, dictionary use is a
relatively new tool for the Supreme Court, gaining popularity in the
Rehnquist Court. 169 By the time Chief Justice Rehnquist was elevated to
the bench, the FAA was over sixty years old, and the Supreme Court had
already decided fourteen FAA cases.
D.

Intentionalist Tools

Intentionalism examines the intent of Congress at the time of a
statute’s passing to determine its meaning. The best evidence of
intentionalism is legislative history. Unfortunately, the “legislative history
of the FAA is scant, at best,” focusing primarily on the enforcement of
arbitration agreements as written involving interstate commerce. 170
Business interests sought passage of the bill, and they were the primary
users of arbitration at the time. 171 The advent of consumer and
employment arbitration came later, as did the phenomenon of asking an
arbitrator to resolve a claim arising under a statute. 172
Overall, the Supreme Court’s reliance on legislative history in the
FAA dataset was low compared to other tools. Approximately 14% of all
opinions relied on legislative history, and another 9% cited or rejected the
use of legislative history. The remaining 77% of opinions failed to
mention legislative history at all. Dissenting opinions were twice as likely,
while concurring opinions were four times as likely, to rely on legislative
history than majority opinions. Majority opinions rejected legislative
history the most. Table 3 shows the frequency and percentage of
legislative history by opinion type.

169. Brudney & Baum, supra note 61, at 494–95 (discussing the dearth of opinions citing
dictionaries prior to 1986).
170. Impact Preemption, supra note 165, at 725. The FAA was primarily a response to judges’
refusal to enforce arbitration agreements as executory contracts. “A party could shirk the duty to
arbitrate by filing a lawsuit at any time prior to the issuance of an arbitrator’s award. Breaching an
arbitration agreement resulted in nominal legal damages, and the courts deemed arbitration
agreements as unenforceable.” Id. at 719.
171. See id. at 725 (discussing the role of Julius Henry Cohen, the “primary drafter” of the FAA
who championed the interests of the New York Chamber of Commerce and the American Bar
Association Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law).
172. Historically, arbitration sought to resolve contract issues between businesses, and expert
businesspersons served as arbitrators. Business parties expected arbitrators to apply industry standards
to disputes on matters such as workmanship, quality, and timeliness. See B LANKLEY & WESTON,
supra note 83, at 176–77 (describing arbitration’s history back to medieval European practice).
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Table 3

Reliance
Reference/Reject
Neither

Majority
(n.50)
n.6 (12%)
n.8 (16%)
n.32 (72%)

Dissent
(n.43)
n.9 (21%)
n.1 (2%)
n.33 (77%)

Concur
(n.21)
n.1 (5%)
n.1 (5%)
n.19 (90%)

All (n.114)
n.16 (14%)
n.10 (9%)
n.88 (77%)

The percentage of FAA cases relying on legislative history is low
compared with other scholars’s studies. For example, the research by
Professors Zaring and Law found an average use of legislative history at
just under 48%, with no statute studied involved less than 13.9% of
opinions citing legislative history. 173 Professor Cross similarly reported a
frequency of legislative history use in 42% of the opinions he studied. 174
In her study of the first three years of the Roberts Court, Professor
Krishnakumar reported a lower number of legislative history use than
other studies (overall use at 23%), and her most recent work reports
similar rates of reliance. 175
The FAA, with 23% of its opinions citing legislative history in some
way, would fit among the studies with the lowest percentages of
reliance. 176 Breaking this number down further, only 9% of majority
decisions and 21% of dissenting decisions rely on legislative history in
the opinion. These numbers are far lower than other reported studies, and
the fact that dissenting options rely on legislative history more than twice
as often as majority opinions is also out of line with previous research. 177
One explanation of the low reliance on legislative history is that the FAA

173. Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1705–06. The Food and Drug Act is the statute with the
highest percentage of opinions citing legislative history, at 73.7%. Id. This study reported that 47.9%
of all opinions cited legislative history.
174. C ROSS, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 145 (“In the data used for my
analysis, some legislative history was used in 42% of the justices’ opinions.”).
175. Roberts Court, supra note 3, at 236 (finding legislative history referenced in 26.5% of
majority opinions, 28.2% of dissenting opinions, and 6.2% of concurring opinions); Backdoor
Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1298; see also Zeppos, supra note 45, at 1093 (“Legislative history is
also frequently cited: congressional reports appear in 32% of the cases, congressional debates in
16.9% of the cases, and congressional hearings in 12.6% of the cases.”).
176. Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1705–06 (reporting the following rates of reliance of
legislative history for the following: Jones Act, 13.9%; Habeas Corpus 16.8%; Federal Employers’
Liability Act 26.5%; and Sherman Antitrust 30.6%).
177. Id. at 1725 (“Our estimation of the model also revealed that the Justices were significantly
less likely to cite to legislative history when authoring dissenting or concurring opinions than when
authoring majority opinions.”).
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is short and not particularly complex, suggesting that the Court does not
need to use legislative history to determine its meaning. 178
Looking at the use of legislative history over time, the raw number
of opinions utilizing legislative history charts is a V-shaped distribution
with the lowest number of opinions in the 1990s. When those numbers are
converted to percentages of total opinions, the normalized distribution
shows a general decline in the use of legislative history over time.
Interestingly, no majority opinion has relied on legislative history since
1995, when the Court decided Allied–Bruce Terminix v. Dobson. 179 Since
then, only dissenting opinions have relied on legislative history. 180 In
contrast, over the whole dataset, eight majority opinions declined to rely
on legislative history, four post-date Terminix, meaning that nearly all
modern FAA majority opinions ignore legislative history altogether. 181
Charts 7 and 8 show the number and percentage of opinions using
legislative history by decade. Perhaps the timing of Allied–Bruce is
evidence of the controversial Scalia effect, theorizing that the Court relied
on legislative history significantly less since Antonin Scalia was
appointed as a Justice. 182
178. Id. at 1720–21 (discussing complexity as a statistically significant variable in predicting the
use of legislative history).
179. Allied–Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274 (1995) (relying on committee
reports).
180. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1642–43 (2018) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)
(“The legislative hearings and debate leading up to the FAA’s passage evidence Congress’ aim to
enable merchants of roughly equal bargaining power to enter into binding agreements to arbitrat e
commercial disputes.”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 477 (2015) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting) (citing legislative history to determine Congress’ intent); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 359–60 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (using legislative history to
determine Congressional intent); Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 126–27 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Nevertheless, the original bill was opposed by representatives of organized
labor, most notably the president of the International Seamen’s Union of America, because of their
concern that the legislation might authorize federal judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses in
employment contracts and collective-bargaining agreements.”); id. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“That conclusion is in fact borne out by the statement of the then-Secretary of Commerce, Herbert
Hoover.”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(relying on multiple pieces of legislative history).
181. See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1631 (“By contrast, the dissent rests its interpretation on
legislative history. But legislative history is not the law.”); AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 345
(relying on prior FAA precedent rather than legislative history); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S.
49, 64 (2009) (referencing legislative history in a citation but without any discussion); Cir. City, 532
U.S. at 119 (“As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the text of § 1, we need not assess the
legislative history of the exclusion provision.”).
182. Legislative History, supra note 108, at 143–44 & tbl. 6; see also Warp and Woof, supra
note 21, at 1256–57 (noting decease in use of legislative history during the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts, particularly in the area of employment cases). But see Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1729
(finding no evidence of a “Scalia effect”).
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This downward trend is also explainable. Congress did not generate
much legislative history when it passed the FAA. 183 Legislative history
use usually goes down over time as the Court interprets the statute. 184
Professors Zaring and Law noticed similar trends among other statutes
and hypothesized that as a statute ages, precedent develops and legislative
history is not needed to the same extent. 185 They also note that when a
statute turns approximately ninety, the Court begins to use legislative
history again 186 to either address uncontemplated problems 187 or move in
a new direction after being “hemmed in” with precedent “in need of
repair.” 188 Under this theory, if the Court began relying on legislative
history again, it would fit in a trend with other roughly ninety-year-old
statutes.
One surprising finding is the type of legislative history the Court
used. Committee reports are generally considered the most reliable form
of legislative history because that material speaks for the whole
committee. Statements made at hearings are among the least reliable.189
Previous studies confirm that the Court also finds committee reports most
reliable by citing them most frequently, followed by debate statements,
and then hearing statements. 190 In the arbitration data, sixteen opinions

183. See Impact Preemption, supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
184. Law & Zaring, supra note 14 at 1720–21 (discussing age as a statistically significant
variable in predicting the use of legislative history). In Professor Staudt’s study shows nearly the exact
opposite phenomenon examining tax statutes. See Staudt, et al., supra note 65, at 1944–45 (describing
phenomenon). Her data show almost no use of legislative history in the first sixty years of the statute’s
existence, with reliance on legislative history “jumping” since the mid 1990s. Id.
185. Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1724 (“The older the statute becomes, however, the more
substantial the body of precedent the Court develops, thus reducing the need for resort to legislative
history.”).
186. Id. at 1722 (“Initially, the probability of legislative history usage decreases with age and
bottoms out when a statute is approximately ninety years old. Beyond that age, however, the
likelihood of legislative history usage begins to increase as the statute gets older.”).
187. Id. at 1724 (“It may be that, beyond a certain age, the guidance of precedent and the benefit
of experience can no longer compensate for the interpretive uncertainty that surrounds an increasingly
antiquated statute.”).
188. Id. at 1725 (noting that Justices may feel “hemmed in by case law that strikes them as
unmanageable, incorrect, or otherwise in need of repair. At that point, legislative history may
constitute a useful tool for overcoming the restraint of stare decisis.”).
189. C ROSS, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 144–45 (discussing the difference
among types of legislative history and citing the significantly higher use of committee reports
compared to other types of legislative history in his data set).
190. Warp and Woof, supra note 21, at 1262 (chart depicting types of legislative history used by
the Court in employment and tax cases); see also Law & Zaring, supra note 14, at (noting that the
Court “cited congressional reports in approximately one-third of its statutory interpretation cases,
congressional debates in another 17%, and congressional hearings in another 13% of cases”);
Schacter, supra note 57 at 15 (“This is not entirely surprising, given that committee reports are widely
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cited legislative history; fourteen unsurprisingly relied on a committee
report; however, seven relied on the testimony of a witness at a
Congressional hearing, while only five relied on the testimony of a
Congress member. Of the opinions that merely referenced or outright
rejected the use of legislative history, in seven of the ten cases, the Court
rejected the use of a committee report, while only one opinion rejected the
testimony of a witness and one rejected the testimony of a Congress
member. Why might a witness receive such deference? That witness was
Julius Henry Cohen, who served as general counsel for the New York
State Chamber of Commerce and was a principal drafter of the FAA.191
Thus, the Court understandably relies on Cohen’s statements to determine
the intent of the FAA, even though overall use of legislative history is
comparatively low.
I originally hypothesized that reliance on legislative history would
be most prominent in the earliest cases. This theory is supported by the
data, although I cannot tell from the data whether this trend exists because
the Court was more open to legislative history in the first half of the
twentieth century or because the FAA was a newer statute with fewer
interpretive cases. The somewhat surprising finding is the increased
mention of legislative history in dissenting opinions in the most recent
decade, supporting Professors Zaring and Law’s theory that Justices
return to an examination of legislative history to find a way to counter the
weight of prior precedent.
E.

Purposivist Tools

This section considers two remaining: (1) practical consequences of
its interpretation; and (2) statements of Congress’s purpose and intent.
Both tools seek to determine how the FAA would interpret the question
today – as opposed to 1925. In the FAA cases, the Court relies on practical
considerations in 51 of its 114 opinions, relying on this tool of
interpretation in 44.7% of all opinions. Majority opinions relied on
practical considerations in roughly 56% of all majority opinions, and
dissents relied on this tool in roughly 63% of all dissenting opinions.
Concurring and other opinions only relied on practical consideration 29%
of the time, but many of those opinions are short and do not rely on a large
regarded as a more credible form of legislative history than, for example, the statements made by
individual legislators.”).
191. Stephen E. Freidman, The Lost Controversy Limitation of the Federal Arbitration Act, 46
U. R ICH. L. R EV. 1005, 1034 (2012); see also Stephen E. Friedman, Trusting Courts with Arbitration
Provisions, 68 C ASE W. R SRV. L. R EV. 821, 826 (2018) (referring to Cohen as a “key driving force
behind and advocate for the FAA”).
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number of tools. These numbers greatly exceed the percentage of opinions
relying on practical considerations by other scholars; the FAA cases rely
on practical considerations ten percentage points or more compared to
other studies. 192
For every case involving practical consequences, I captured the type
of practical concern addressed by the court. The Court’s top practical
concern was an administrative concern. Chart 9 depicts the breakdown of
all the practical consequences discussed, and Chart 10 breaks down those
numbers further by isolating the majority and dissenting opinions. Of the
fifty-four cases discussing practical consequences (fifty-one relying on
practical consequences, and three rejecting or not relying on the
argument), twenty-nine considered administrative aspects, or 53.7% of all
these references. Among majority opinions, administrative concerns arose
nineteen times, or 38% of all majority opinions; dissenting opinions rely
on administrative concerns only six times, or 15% of all dissents.
Administrative concerns ranged from an arbitrator’s ability to interpret
arbitration forums rules, 193 to forum shopping between federal and state
courts, 194 to the practical differences between bilateral and classwide
arbitration, among others. 195 The individual justices invoking practical
consideration include both liberal and conservative justices, as well as
originalist, purposivist, and intentionalist jurists. The high reliance on
administrative concerns is not surprising given the subject matter at issue.
The second most frequently cited practical concern is fairness. The
Court discussed fairness concerns in nineteen opinions, or 35.8% of all
opinions discussing practical consequences. Unlike administrative
concerns, fairness concerns appear disproportionally in dissenting
192. Backdoor Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1297 (finding reliance on practical consequences
at 33.9%); see id. at 1319–20 (finding textualist judges “regularly invoked practical reasoning in the
opinions they authored . . . [at a rate of 31.2%]. This in itself is significant, because practical
considerations are entirely external to the statutory text and because textualists regularly denounce
consequentialism as an inappropriate basis for judicial decision-making.”); Roberts Court, supra note
3, at 236 (finding an overall rate of relying on practical consequences at 33.2%); McGowan, supra
note 66, at 174 (finding that Justice Scalia’s dissents invoke practical consequences 55% of the time);
Zeppos, supra note 45, at 1107 (finding practical considerations cited in 28.8% of cases).
193. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (“Moreover, the NASD
arbitrators, comparatively more expert about the meaning of their own rule, are comparatively better
able to interpret and to apply it.”).
194. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 446 U.S. 49, 67–70 (2009) (discussing a number of practical
consequences for interpreting the statute, particularly in refuting a contrary reading by the dissent).
195. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 239 (2013) (“Such a preliminary
litigating hurdle would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in
general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure. The FAA does not sanction such a
judicially created superstructure.”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 347–50
(2011) (discussing a litany of practical differences between class arbitration and bilateral arbitration).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss1/3

46

Blankley: Federal Arbitration Act

2022]

F EDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

147

opinions. Fairness concerns arise in nine dissenting opinions, or a rate of
22% of dissenting opinions, and only five times in majority opinions, or
10% of all majority opinions. Fairness concerns arise most commonly in
opinions written by liberal-leaning justices, but these concerns are not
new. As early as the overruled Wilko v. Swan case, the Court considered
the implications of its ruling to individual investors in language that rings
of fairness, even if that word is not expressly used. 196 In more recent years,
fairness concerns most frequently occur in dissents in cases limiting the
availability of classwide procedures in arbitration. 197
A more recently articulated practical concern is the business
consequences of an interpretation. Overall, five opinions rely on business
concerns—three majority opinions and two dissents. The most notable
decision relying on business concerns is Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. 198 The Concepcion case preempted a
California rule that would have invalidated most class action waivers in
consumer contracts and opened the door for class procedures in
arbitration. 199 The Court reasoned that “class arbitration greatly increases
the risks to defendants” and that arbitration “is poorly suited to the higher
stakes of class litigation.” 200 The Court further stated: “We find it hard to
believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means
of review, and even harder to believe that Congress would have intended
to allow state courts to force such a decision.” 201 However, the majority
opinion’s discussion of practical concerns is limited to business
defendants. The Court does not engage in a similar analysis of the
practical considerations for plaintiffs who would likely forego bringing a
196. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–37 (1953) (discussing the potential harm to investors if
non-lawyer arbitrators determine the applicability of statutory rights); see also Commonwealth
Coatings v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (positing that certain arbitrator disclosure
requirements will result in a fairer process if the parties are satisfied that the arbitrator is not biased).
197. See, e.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1421 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“The widely experienced neglect he identified cries out for collective treatment. Blocking Varela’s
path to concerted action, the Court aims to ensure the authenticity of consent to class procedures in
arbitration.”); id. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Where, as here, an employment agreement
provides for arbitration as a forum for all disputes relating to a person’s employment and the rules of
that forum allow for class actions, an employee who signs an arbitration agreement should not be
expected to realize that she is giving up access to that procedural device.”); DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 477 (2015) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“These decisions have predictably
resulted in the deprivation of consumers’ rights to seek redress for losses, and, turning the coin, they
have insulated powerful economic interests from liability for violations of consumer-protectio n
laws.”).
198. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
199. Id. at 352 (“California’s Discover Bank rule is pre-empted by the FAA.”).
200. Id. at 350.
201. Id. at 351.
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claim at all if the case cannot proceed in a class. 202 Instead, the Court
appears to be selectively using the tool of practical consequences to
achieve the ultimate outcome—a limitation to class procedures.
Chart 9
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202. The Concepcion case involved such a situation: a low dollar claim that would not be worth
pursuing on its own. The Concepcions suffered an economic loss of only $30.22. Id. at 337.
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The Court’s reliance on the FAA’s purpose and intent, like its
reliance on practical considerations, is surprisingly high. Overall, 41.2%
of all opinions relied on intent or purpose (47 of 114), and only five
opinions (or 4.4%) invoked but rejected or refused to rely on the intent on
Congress or the purpose of the statute. By decision type, 44.0% of all
majority opinions and 51.2% of all dissents relied on Congress’ intent or
purpose, while only 14.3% of concurring and other opinions relied on
these practical considerations. These numbers are difficult to compare to
other scholars because every study includes different things in this
category. 203 In the arbitration dataset, invoking purpose or intent cuts
across time, political leanings, and legal category.
The Court and individual Justices cite to several different purposes
and intents, giving rise to the question of whether Congressional intent or
legislative purpose leads to consistent results or simply an end to a
preferred outcome. Perhaps the most cited Congressional intent is that
“[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce
private agreements into which parties had entered,” requiring rigorous
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. 204 Indeed, the arbitration canon
first pronounced in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital is based on this
Congressional intent. 205 Similarly, the Court noted that the purpose of the
FAA is to “place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other
contracts.” 206 Since roughly 2010, the Court has consistently presumed
that Congress did not intend for arbitration to proceed on a classwide
basis, even though class procedures did not exist in 1925 the way they do
now. 207

203. See, e.g., Backdoor Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1298 (finding 24.9% of all Roberts’
Court opinions relying on the statute’s purpose and 11.9% of opinions relying on legislative intent);
Canons of Construction, supra note 20, at 30 (finding that 81.2% of opinions rely on “legislative
purpose,” which appears to include purpose, intent, and practical consequences); Staudt, et al., supra
note 57, at 1946 (including a broad range of tools and finding that “nearly 50 percent of the Court’s
decisions invoked materials associated with congressional intent and purpose.”).
204. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (the Court’s first arbitration
provision contained similar language, albeit in the area of admiralty); Marine Trans. Corp. v. Dreyfus,
284 U.S. 263, 275 (1932) (“The intent of section 8 is to provide for the enforcement of the agreement
for arbitration, without depriving the aggrieved party of his right, under the admiralty practice, to
proceed against ‘the vessel or other property’ belonging to the other party to the agreement.”).
205. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.1, 24 (1983) (regarding
the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreement”).
206. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
207. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2010) (“First, the switch from
bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final
judgment.”).
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A final purposivist tool is legislative inaction, inferring the
legislature’s intent from its failure to amend a statute following the
Court’s precedent. Only two majority opinions rely on legislative
inaction. 208 Given the age of the statute, I expected to see legislative
inaction relied on more frequently, particularly given the increased
number of arbitration cases heard by the courts since 2000.
F.

Overarching Observations and Musings on the Future of the FAA

In many respects, this discussion demonstrates that the Court
frequently interprets the FAA like other statutes, with some exceptions.
Two of the most interesting exceptions are reliance on substantive
canons—notably the arbitration canon—and reliance on the practical
effects of the given cases. These two types of tools are malleable and can
support a number of outcomes. While practical considerations are an
obvious purposivist tool, the use of canons has come under criticism for
being as outcome-determinative as other purposivist tools, such as
legislative history. 209 This section considers the outcome-determinative
nature of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence and Congress’s likelihood
to engage in an override of these cases.
1. The Court Interprets the FAA in an Outcome-Determinative
Manner
This research appears to overlap with other scholars’ observations
that the Supreme Court acts in ways that are purposivist and, at times,
outcome determinative. Even as the Court relied less on legislative history
over the last three decades, the Court may simply be replacing the tools
of interpretation to achieve certain ends, a technique that Professor
Krishnakumar calls “backdoor purposivism.” 210 Professor McGowan’s
study of Justice Scalia dissents concludes that despite his textualist
rhetoric, he commonly relies on legislative purpose, including “his own
sense of a statute’s aims.” 211

208. Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122 (2001) (“In Allied–Bruce the Court noted
that Congress had not moved to overturn Southland, and we now note that it has not done so in
response to Allied–Bruce itself.”); Allied–Bruce Terminix Co., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995)
(“Further, Congress, both before and after Southland, has enacted legislation extending, not retracting,
the scope of arbitration.”).
209. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
210. Backdoor Purposivism, supra note 51, at 1290–91 (describing the phenomenon of textualist
justices using new tools to achieve the ends those justices have criticized of purposivist jurists).
211. McGowan, supra note 66, at 189.
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This study aligns with an overarching theme within the literature that
tools are used subjectively, even when the stated intent of the tool is to
reduce subjectivity. For instance, Professors Brudney and Baum
concluded that the Court’s “highly subjective and ad hoc approach to
choosing dictionaries” is not subject to any specific practice or rules. 212
If the results of this data suggest that the Court is highly purposivist
in its opinions, what are those purposes? While the primary purpose of the
FAA is to enforce arbitration agreements, that purpose has expanded
greatly to include enforcement of arbitration agreements at almost all
costs. Beginning in the 1980s and continuing to the present, the Court has
found more agreements subject to arbitration, and using arbitration law
(such as the doctrine of arbitrability) increased the power of arbitrators
and put them in self-interested positions. Additionally, the Court has used
arbitration to further limit the availability of class actions. Stated
differently, increasing arbitration and decreasing class action processes
appear to be the Court’s twin purposes.
The other overarching theme evident from this data is the insular
nature of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. Compared to other studies,
the Court’s overreliance on FAA precedent, the text of the FAA, and the
arbitration canon (created by FAA precedent) builds a body of law more
reliant on the Court than any outside source. This self-reliance leads to the
expanded applicability of the FAA. As a result, the Court’s cases are
becoming increasingly controversial, as evidenced by increased
concurring and dissenting opinions and the recent emergence of
arguments based on legislative history in dissenting opinions.
These themes are clear in some of the most recent cases decided by
the Supreme Court—notably the Epic Systems and the Lamps Plus
decisions. Although both cases involve the availability of class action
arbitration, the cases pose different legal questions for the Court. In Epic
Systems, Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion in a five to four
decision of the Court. 213 This may be considered among the cases
involving a Thomas Effect, Justice Thomas providing the critical fifth vote
while also authoring a concurring opinion critical of aspects of the Court’s
FAA jurisprudence. 214 The question for the Court was whether the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) required the availability of class

212.
213.
214.
Section 2

Brudney & Baum, supra note 61, at 566.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
Id. at 1632 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting disagreement with the Court’s interpretation of
of the FAA).
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procedures in labor and employment arbitration. 215 In answering this
question in the negative, the Court began by relying on the text, prior
precedent, and a statement of Congress’s intent to enforce agreements to
arbitrate as written, even when an employer includes a class action waiver
in an employment contract. 216 After considering whether the NLRA
provided a contrary congressional command, the Court’s decision relied
on a series of precedent and the fact that no Supreme Court opinion had
ever found such command to override the FAA. 217 The Court also relied
on the practical consequence that class action procedures may unfairly
pressure corporate defendants into settling unmeritorious lawsuits as it
holds that NLRA’s language does not prohibit employers and employees
from agreeing to bilateral arbitration. 218 Stated another way, the Court
relies on the text, prior precedent, and purpose in a decision that extends
the enforcement of arbitration agreements in the employment context at
the expense of classwide procedures—even classwide procedures in
arbitration.
In the following term, the Lamps Plus majority decision, again
authored by Justice Gorsuch, further limits the availability of class actions
by expanding on prior precedent. 219 The case involved courts’ authority
to determine whether an arbitration agreement supported an order to
compel classwide arbitration. 220 The FAA does not address classwide
arbitration, so the Court turned to previous FAA precedent hostile to
classwide arbitration and policy reasons favoring individual
arbitration. 221 The Court further relies on practical considerations such as
expense, time, and formality, as additional reasons for its holding hostile
to classwide arbitration. 222 The Lamps Plus decision also involves the
Thomas Effect: Justice Thomas joins the majority of the five-to-four
decision with a separate concurring opinion. All four dissenting justices
215. Id. at 1619 (“Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes
between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be
permitted to bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with their
employers?”).
216. Id. at 1621 (discussing intent, text, and prior precedent).
217. Id. at 1627–28.
218. Id. at 1632 (noting business pressures involved in class action procedures).
219. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
220. Id. at 1413 (reviewing the 9th Circuit decision allowing the order of classwide arbitration).
221. Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen, N.A. v. International AnimalFeeds, Int’l Corp., 599 U.S. 662, 684
(2009) and Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1623).
222. Id. at 1416 (“Our reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen controls the question we face today. Like
silence, ambiguity does not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that parties to an arbitration
agreement agreed to sacrifice[ ] the principal advantage of arbitration.”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
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wrote opinions in the matter. Lamp’s Plus’ six separate opinions marks
the most separate decisions in a single arbitration case.
However, even in the Court’s less controversial decisions, the themes
of reliance on prior precedent and expanded power for arbitration continue
Ato shine through. For example, Justice Kavanaugh’s unanimous decision
in Henry Schein v. Archer & White begins with the arbitrator’s broad
powers to determine matters of arbitrability, i.e., the arbitrator’s own
jurisdiction: “Under the Act and this Court’s cases, the question of who
decides arbitrability is itself a question of contract. The Act allows parties
to agree by contract that an arbitrator, rather than a court, will resolve
threshold arbitrability questions as well as underlying merits disputes.”223
Although this statement is not itself controversial, it is telling that the
Court’s authority for this proposition does not include the text of the FAA
but relies only on FAA precedent. 224 Indeed, the Court cannot cite the
FAA because it does not speak directly to the issue of arbitrability.
Ultimately, the Henry Schein Court broadens the scope of arbitrators’
powers primarily on precedent and, to a lesser degree, practical
considerations (such as the interplay between courts and arbitrators). 225
2. Congressional Override of FAA Jurisprudence?
Finally, a question arises as to what this research shows about the
future of the FAA in Congress. Research on congressional overrides (i.e.,
Congress’s overturning a Supreme Court decision by revising a statute)
suggests that certain factors may predict whether Congress will amend a
statute, including: (1) close vote margins; (2) the United States on the
losing end of a decision; (3) decisions relying on highly textualist tools,
such as the whole act rule; and (4) Justices inviting Congress to amend
the statute. 226 Applying these criteria to the FAA, one might expect
Congress to override current arbitration jurisprudence by amending the
Act. For the first criterion, recent cases such as Epic Systems v. Lewis and
Lamps Plus v. Varela involved close vote counts and multiple opinions.
While the second criterion is not applicable, this analysis shows the
223. Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. 139 S. Ct. 524, 527 (2019).
224. Id. (citing Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) and First Options of
Chi. Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943–44 (1955)); see also id. at 529 (“We conclude that the ‘wholly
groundless’ exception is inconsistent with the text of the Act and with our precedent.”).
225. Id. at 531 (discussing practical concerns). This particular case is an interesting example of
a conservative leaning justice rejecting the application of the whole act rule because prior precedent
leaned towards providing the arbitrator additional power to render the decision at hand. Id. at 530
(noting “that ship has sailed” regarding a different reading of Section 4 of the FAA).
226. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1387–90 (discussing prior literature and
providing brief summary of results).
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reliance on textualist tools, including the whole act rule. As for the fourth
criterion, the Epic Systems Court, while not exactly inviting Congress to
amend the FAA, specifically notes that Congress is “always free to
amend” the statute if it disagrees with the Court. 227 These factors indicate
that the time may be right for Congress to override the Court’s decision.
Arbitration scholars have been asking Congress to amend the FAA
in some way, shape, or form for years. 228 Professors Christiansen and
Eskridge theorize that one reason Congress has not overridden the FAA
is that the business entities benefiting from Court’s rulings are effective
in keeping the matter off “the congressional agenda.” 229 Although
Congress has not engaged in an overhaul of the FAA, it has passed
legislation regulating arbitration in niche areas, such as mortgage lending
and cases involving sexual harassment. 230
Another reason why Congress may be hesitant to step in and override
is that while the decisions since the mid-1980s have largely expanded the
powers of arbitrators and favored business interests, a sprinkling of welltimed cases have leaned in favor of consumer and employee interests,
which might lessen political will to change the statute. For instance, First
Options of Chicago v. Kaplan clarified the role of courts in determining
whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, 231 Green Tree v. Randolph
preserved the possibility of court if the arbitral forum is prohibitively
expensive, and Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter preserved an arbitrator’s

227. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018); see also Compucredit Corp. v.
Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 109 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Of course, if we have misread
Congress’ intent, then Congress can correct our error by amending the statute.”).
228. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Blurred Lines: Are Non-Attorneys Who Represent Parties in
Arbitrations Involving Statutory Claims Practicing Law?, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. R EV. 921, 971 (2015)
(noting that many have called for Congress to amend the FAA and the difficulties with that
suggestion); Imre Stephen Szalai, Correcting a Flaw in the Arbitration Fairness Act, 2013 J. DISP.
R ESOL. 271, 272–73 (2013) (noting that the FAA intended to cover only business disputes and
Congress needs to amend it to achieve those original goals); Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How
Congress Can Create a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 P ENN. S T. L. R EV. 1081, 1083–
84 (2009) (“This article proposes amending the FAA to ensure more equitable arbitration contracts
and procedures. An amended FAA will save time and expense in predispute contract enforcemen t
litigation.”).
229. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1380 n.228.
230. See 9. U.S.C. §402 (2022) (prohibiting enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreement s
for cases of sexual assault and sexual harassment); Kristen M. Blankley, Creating a Framework for
Examining Agency Rules Impacting Arbitration, 63 WASH. U. J.L. & P OL’Y 9, 11–12 (2020)
(discussing Congress’ inability to pass sweeping arbitration legislation and success in some smaller
areas).
231. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (finding no agreement to
arbitrate under the facts of the case).
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reading of a contract allowing for classwide arbitration. 232 Most recently,
in New Prime v. Oliveria, the Court affirmed that independent contractors
in the trucking industry fall outside of the FAA, and thus courts cannot
compel them to arbitrate. 233 This push and pull may make arbitration
reform less urgent. 234 If Congress attempts to rein in arbitrator power and
the business interests advanced in many of these decisions, it will likely
only have the will to amend the FAA with a liberal Congress and liberal
White House.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Under other circumstances, this statutory interpretation analysis may
show an upcoming tipping point in FAA jurisprudence. On the one hand,
the increasingly divided Court on arbitration issues, the closer vote counts
in recent years, and the renewed interest in legislative history might
indicate that the interpretation of the FAA has reached its limits. On the
other hand, the current ideological makeup of the Court with six
conservative-leaning and three liberal-leaning Justices may indicate that
the business interests protected in recent cases—particularly class action
cases—will continue to be protected into the future.
This research raises additional questions to be explored in future
papers. While the purpose of this Article is to compare the arbitration
dataset with previous research by other scholars, it should be examined
for trends specific to arbitration. Notably, a future article should examine
whether different analytical trends emerge among different arbitration
issues, i.e., the data should be analyzed to determine if the court utilizes
different tools in arbitrability cases compared to preemption cases.
Similarly, an analysis comparing the tools of interpretation used on the
FAA and those used to interpret other statutes in arbitration cases might
yield interesting patterns. Additional research should also consider the
tools used in class action arbitration cases compared to non-class action
cases to see if significant differences exist between those cases. Further,

232. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (“It may well be that the
existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectivel y
vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,
569 U.S. 564, 573 (2013) (“The arbitrator’s construction holds, however good, bad, or ugly.”).
233. New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 544 (2019) (finding the FAA not applicable).
234. But see Imre Szalai, The Supreme Court’s Landmark Decision in New Prime v. Oliveira: A
Panoptic View of America’s Civil Justice System and Arbitration, 68 EMORY L. J. ONLINE 1059, 1068
(2019) (describing the Court’s precedent as more akin to a “decades-long, steady, pro-arbitration ”
march).
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analyses related to individual justices may uncover interesting trends,
particularly Justice Thomas’s role in arbitration cases.
While most arbitration scholarship considers the substance of what
the Supreme Court decides, this article begins a scholarly conversation on
how the Court conducts its analyses. This new interpretive lens provides
new insight into an old statute and uncovers analytical trends over time.
Additional work in this area will continue to illuminate arbitration
jurisprudence and provide further granularity.
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